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The problems of public housing-including crime, drugs, and gun vio-
lence-have received an enormous amount of national attention. Much
attention has also focused on warrantless searches and consent searches
as solutions to these problems. This Note addresses the constitutional-
ity of these proposals and asserts that if the Supreme Court's current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is taken to its logical extremes, war-
rantless searches in public housing can be found constitutional. The
author argues, however, that such an interpretation fails to strike the
proper balance between public need and privacy in the public housing
context. The Note concludes by proposing alternative consent-based
regimes that would pass constitutional muster.
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INTRODUCTION
Crime, the fear of crime, and violence have become issues of
great concern in our society For many segments of the population,
these issues are not just abstract concerns, but everyday realities. As
society is confronted with unprecedented safety concerns, the calls
for action grow louder.3 National, state, and municipal governments
are pressured to respond, often with aggressive law enforcement
programs or measures designed to deal with the problems of crime
and violence and allay the fears of constituents.4 In many cases, the
1. Money Tonight: New York Legalizes Defense Sprays (CNBC television broadcast,
Nov. 1, 1996), available in 1996 WL 11488099 (noting that voters in the 1996
presidential elections stated that crime was "their number-one issue"); Reducing Gun
Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Andrew L. Vita, Chief, Firearms Div.
of the Dep't of the Treasury Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms), available in
1994 WL 381890 (F.D.C.H.) (commenting that "violent crime continues to tear at the
fiber of civilized societies" and that "the number of firearms used in armed robberies,
assaults, and murders has escalated at an alarming rate and is now the number one
concern of the American public"); Suburban Voters'Fear of Crime Is Election Target, THE
FORTH WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 10, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9292300; cf.
Money Tonight: National Center for Health Statistics Data States that Americans are
Increasingly Sedentary and Overweight (CNBC television broadcast, Oct. 15, 1996),
available in 1996 WL 11487959 (reporting a correlation between the fear of crime and
weight gain).
2. For instance, in 1980 the United States Department of Justice reported that
among African American men and women between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-
four, homicide is the leading cause of death. William Julius Wilson, The Urban Under-
class in Advanced Industrial Society, in THE NEW URBAN REALITY 129, 134 (Paul E.
Peterson ed., 1985).
3. See, e.g., Ted Gest et al., Violence in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 17,
1994, at 22, 22-24 (noting that a "scary orgy of violent crime is fueling another public
call to action").
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proposed measures raise difficult issues that threaten to push the
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment.5 As Professor Yale Kamisar
noted, societal problems "have put enormous pressure on the Fourth
Amendment. Very few people (and perhaps not too many judges)
will worry about losses of privacy when the government claims that
such losses are 'necessary' in order to win 'the war against drugs.' ,6
If there is a place where issues of crime and violence are of par-
ticular solicitude, it is in the area of public housing.7 In the last few
years public housing has often been at the center of national atten-
tion.8 Public housing has received much attention because of the
high incidence of crime, violence, drug use, and various social dis-
orders that are present in many public housing complexes.9 The
magnitude of the problem is best articulated by former Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Henry Cisneros:
4. See, e.g., Michael Kramer, Clinton's House Rules, TIME, May 9, 1994, at 55
(reporting that President Clinton advocates warrantless searches of housing projects
because of the level of criminal activity in public housing); Dateline NBC: Knock on Any
Door; Federal Government One Strike Program Evicts Family from Public Housing (NBC
television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1996), available in 1996 WL 6704716; Senators Kyl and
Feinstein Re-Introduce Victims' Rights Amendment, Gov't Press Releases, Oct. 1, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 11125538 (noting Senators Kyl and Feinstein's proposed amend-
ment to the United States Constitution "to establish and protect the rights of crime
victims"); Illinois to Receive Over $1.8 Million to Redeploy 76 Police Officers on the Streets,
Gov't Press Releases, Oct. 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11125646 (reporting Senator
Carol Moseley-Braun and Congressman Dick Durbin's announcement that Illinois will
receive almost two million dollars to hire police officers to better combat crime).
5. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (holding that
nonconsensual urinalysis testing of student-athletes is constitutional in school district
with drug problems).
6. Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment: The Right of the People to Be Secure in Their
Persons, Homes, Papers, and Effects, in A TIME FOR CHOICES 31, 32 (Claudia A. Haskel &
Jean H. Otto eds., 1991).
7. See, e.g., Joe Davidson, White House Aims at Fighting Crime In Public Housing With
New Program, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1994, at B9 (noting the Clinton administration's
commitment to fighting violent crime in public housing); Mark Schaver, Murder in the
Projects: Louisville's Public Housing Is Hot Spot for Homicides, COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov.
10, 1996, at 1A (noting that in Louisville, Kentucky the murder rate in public housing
is more than eight times the murder rate in the rest of the city); Paul W. Valentine,
Taking Back Public Housing, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1992, at B5 (detailing one method of
dealing with Baltimore's public housing drug and violence problem).
8. See, e.g., Zachare Ball & Bill McGraw, U.S. Threatens to Sue City over Public Hous-
ing Woes, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 30, 1992, at 4B; Kevin G. Salwen, White House
Proposal Allows Searches Without Warrants in Public Housing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1994,
at A16; Securing Buildings vs. Controlling Firearms: Rampant Gun Crime Demands Com-
prehensive Curbs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at B6.
9. See, e.g., Drugs and Public Housing: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on In-
vestigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong. 1 (1989)
[hereinafter Drugs & Public Housing Hearing] (statement of Senator Sam Nunn) (noting
that "[d]aily news reports have documented in graphic and, in many cases, terrifying
detail, the fact that drug dealers have turned many public housing projects into virtual
no-man's lands where violence has become the only rule").
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[T]he current public housing system is plagued by a series
of deeply-rooted and systemic problems. Concrete high
rises have become vacant shells, scarring the urban land-
scape. Other projects are beset by crime and gang activity.
The very names of some places[-]Cabrini Green, Robert
Taylor Homes, Desire-haunt the American imagination.
Other problems exist in the 100-odd public housing agen-
cies that are classified as troubled entities.
Change is needed. Far reaching reform is warranted.'0
This Note explores how current Fourth Amendment doctrine is
being shaped to accommodate modern social problems." It is not
directly concerned with the Fourth Amendment as a device that ei-
ther hampers or facilitates criminal behavior per se or as a device
regulating police-suspect behavior. Rather, this Note is interested in
the Fourth Amendment as a civil device that addresses issues out-
side of the usual police-suspect domain.12 As Professor Sundby
stated, "Fourth Amendment issues increasingly do not concern un-
expected police-suspect encounters where the police need fast and
ready rules, but involve searches and seizures based on a preexisting
legislative or administrative plan.' 3 This Note explores how the
Fourth Amendment deals with, and to some extent accommodates,
preexisting legislative or administrative plans designed to tackle so-
cial problems.
10. Public Housing Reform and Empowerment Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1260 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 80 (1995) (statement
of Henry G. Cisneros, Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment); see also David Ramos, HUD-dled Masses: Cisneros Wimps Out on Housing Reform,
NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 14, 1994, at 12 (quoting Secretary Cisneros' statement that "[tihe
most serious problem we have in America today is the concentrations of our very
poorest populations in ... specific neighborhoods").
11. In this regard this Note's purpose differs from the bulk of Fourth Amendment
scholarship which is concerned with specifically cabining police behavior (or cabining
criminal behavior), or how the Fourth Amendment forsakes individual rights in the
name of more efficient law-making (or vice-versa). See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Con-
trolling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police
Rules & Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH L. REV. 442, 492 (1990)
(stating that a central concern of the Fourth Amendment is regulating arbitrary con-
duct); Jane Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death
of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 167-68 (1996) ("While the history of the
Fourth Amendment is incredibly rich and complex, its animating purpose appears to
be curbing arbitrary use of police power.").
12. Undoubtedly, the Fourth Amendment as a civil device is intertwined with the
Fourth Amendment as a criminal device. However, this Note attempts to deal with the
former, while drawing on the latter only when appropriate.
13. Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman's" Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1786 (1994) (citation
omitted).
[VOL. 2:461
HeinOnline  -- 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 464 1996-1997
SPRING 1997] Fourth Amendment Accommodations
Public housing is an exemplary model for such an examination.
First, the problems of public housing are as much social problems as
they are police problems. Second, the problems confronting Public
Housing Authorities (PHAs) present the type of national emergency
where calls to action threaten Fourth Amendment principles This
sense of urgency provides the justification for proposed legislative
or administrative responses. Third, the problems of public housing
present an apparent clash between two equally compelling sets of
values: 5 those of safety (or security) and those of privacy.' 6
In addressing the question of these clashing values and the
substantive problems posed by public housing, commentators and
policy-makers have proposed many solutions. However, it is with
the two most controversial suggestions--conducting warrantless
searches of public housing complexes and inserting consent to
search clauses in leases of public housing residents-with which
this Note is concerned. Interestingly, the most prevalent constitu-
tional weapons in the fight to abate threats to public safety have
been the doctrine of warrantless searches and seizures 7 and the
14. See, e.g., Andrew T. Pittman & Mark R. Slough, Commentary, Drug Testing of
High School Student Athletes After Vemonia, 104 EDUC. L. REP. 15, 17 (1995).
15. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (discussing the clash of
values issue); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 197, 198 (1993) (stating as the "dilemma" of the Fourth Amendment the
capacity to determine the importance of privacy versus personal security).
16. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to privacy deserves its
greatest protection in one's home. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589
(1980) ("The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of set-
tings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that finds its roots
in clear and specific constitutional terms ...."); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961) (asserting the same conclusion); see also United States v. Orito, 413 U.S.
139, 142 (1973) (stating that the "Constitution extends special safeguards to the pri-
vacy of the home"); Jason Marks, Mission Impossible?: Rescuing the Fourth Amendment
from the War on Drugs, 11 CRIM. JUST. 16 (Spring 1996) ("The autonomy and inviolabil-
ity of the person and the home stand as the first principle of natural law.").
17. The Supreme Court has established numerous exceptions to the usual Fourth
Amendment requirement that a search or seizure must be based on probable cause
and executed pursuant to a valid warrant. Some of these exceptions include: investiga-
tory detentions, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that a brief investigatory
seizure does not need to be based on probable cause; reasonable suspicion is suffi-
cient); search incident to an arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981)
(holding that police officers may conduct a warrantless search of a detainee following
an arrest without probable cause or reasonable suspicion); Michigan v. DeFilippo, 443
U.S. 31, 35 (1979) (asserting the same conclusion); border searches, United States v.
Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1985) (holding that warrantless border
searches are permissible because the United States government has the right to pre-
vent contraband from entering this country); and searches in which the special needs
of law enforcement personnel would make procuring a warrant impracticable,
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720-22 (1987) (plurality opinion) (holding that a
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doctrine of consent searches and seizures. 8 The availability of these
doctrines is related to the fact that the Supreme Court has signifi-
cantly expanded the areas in which warrantless searches are
constitutionally permitted in order to facilitate more efficient law
enforcement, 9 and the fact that the Court has viewed the doctrine of
consent searches and seizures as a necessary tool of law enforce-
ment.2° Accordingly, it applies a minimal standard for determining
when consent has been constitutionally acquired."
It is thus not surprising that solutions to the ills of public
housing have centered around those two tools. This Note focuses on
proposed solutions to address the Fourth Amendment concerns
raised by warrantless searches of public housing complexes and the
use of consent-to-search clauses as constitutional responses to in-
domitable social problems in public housing. This Note specifically
addresses two issues: first, are warrantless searches of housing proj-
ects a viable constitutional tool? Second, may public housing
authorities avoid the grasp of the Fourth Amendment by inserting
consent clauses in the leases of public housing residents?
Part I provides a brief overview of the history of public housing
in the United States and develops the social setting in which the
problems of public housing arose. Part II analyzes warrantless
administrative searches under the Fourth Amendment. This part is
especially concerned with exploring the dynamics of a constitutional
scheme that tries to strike a balance between a compelling public
need and an equally compelling privacy interest. Part III examines
the issue of consent-to-search clauses and to what extent these
clauses raise Fourth Amendment concerns.
I. HISTORY OF PUBLIC HOUSING
The existence of public housing in the United States is a direct
result of the federal government's concerns regarding the substan-
dard conditions and general inhabitability of housing available in
most major cities.22 Surprisingly, public housing was not authorized
particularly as alternative housing for poor Americans; the propo-
nents of public housing were primarily concerned with eradicating
the social disorders23 and the danger to public welfare that were as-
state may search an employee's office without a warrant when investigating work-
related misconduct as long as the search is reasonable).
18. For discussion on consent searches, see infra Part Ill.
19. See sources cited, supra note 17.
20. See infra Part II1.
21. See infra Part III.
22. ROBERT MOORE FISHER, 20 YEARS OF PUBLIC HOUSING 8-12 (1959) (discussing
the pros and cons of public housing in justifying a federally aided low-rent program).
23. Id. at 9.
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sociated with slum housing. Public housing became low-rent
housing because it was thought that people who lived in slum
housing did so because they could not afford better housing.
25
Public housing in this country has always been controversial."
The reasons for the controversy have generally been threefold: (a)
public housing has generally provided housing for the poor; (b)
public housing has raised serious questions regarding the proper
role of the federal government; and (c) public housing has generally
been perceived as providing housing primarily for racial minorities,
specifically Black and Latina/o Americans, who constituted a dis-
proportionate proportion of the poor.27
Bubbling below the surface of the public housing discussion is
the role of race in public housing. Although public housing was not
necessarily designed to deal with the housing needs of racial mi-
norities, race always played a major role in the public housing
context. First, racial minorities constituted a disproportionate num-
ber of poor Americans 9 Second, housing facilities of Blacks and
other minorities were disproportionately substandard," not only
because minority groups were disproportionately poor, but also be-
cause they were often the victims of housing discrimination.3 1 Third,
the migration of Blacks from the South to Northern cities caused
24. Fisher reports that Senator Wagner, co-author of the Wagner-Steagall Act,
which served as authority for the first low-rent public housing projects, made it clear
that the purpose of the Act was not to rehouse "'everybody who has a low income,
but only persons of low income who live in unsanitary and unsafe and unhealthy
conditions which are detrimental to morals, to health, and also to safety.'" Id. at 11.
Fisher also notes that the findings that formed the preliminary paragraphs of the bill,
although deleted, stated as reasons making the bill necessary the existence "in urban
and rural communities throughout the United States slums, blighted areas, or unsafe,
insanitary [sic], or overcrowded dwellings, or a combination of these conditions, ac-
companied and aggravated by an acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary
dwellings within the financial reach of families of low income." Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 9-10.
26. LEONARD FREEDMAN, PUBLIC HOUSING: THE POLITICS OF POVERTY 7-11 (1969).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 132-34.
29. Id. at 132.
30. Id. at 133.
31. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding discriminatory housing
practices in the form of restrictive covenants violative of the Fourteenth Amendment);
A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 50 (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin
M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989); FREEDMAN, supra note 26, at 134; JOHN YINGER, U.S. DEP'T
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: IN-
CIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF UNFAVORABLE TREATMENT, at xiv-xv (1991) (detailing
unfavorable treatment and discrimination experienced by Blacks and Latinos in the
housing market); see generally HOUSING AND HOME FINANCING AGENCY, PUBLIC
HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, OPEN OCCUPANCY IN HOUSING PROGRAMS OF THE PUBLIC
HOUSING ADMINISTRATION (1955).
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shortages of decent housing in the North.32 Fourth, government
agencies themselves engaged in intentionally discriminatory prac-
tices.33 Last, public housing was the object of liberal reformers who
used the forum of public housing to conduct social experiments on
integration.3 Thus, almost from its genesis, public housing has been
embroiled in racial issues.
A chief concern in public housing is violence.35 The problem of
violence in low-income housing, however, is not a recent develop-
ment. Indeed, public housing was designed to be a remedy for the
violence that was characteristic of slum housing. The proponents of
public housing argued that the creation of public housing would
solve the epidemic of violence associated with slum living.36 Given
that these were the very ills that public housing was designed to
eradicate, it is quite ironic that public housing is now perceived as
the source of the pathologies that were once thought to be caused by
slum and substandard housing.
Perhaps predictably, the concentration of a poor and socially
isolated class of people with limited economic opportunities in re-
32. FREEDMAN, supra note 26, at 136-37; see also KARL E. TAEUBER & ALMA F.
TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES (1965) (discussing some aspects of the great black migra-
tion). Nicholas Lemann stated that:
Between 1910 and 1920 the first wave of 572,000 blacks moved from the South
to the North, almost always to cities. In the twenties 913,000 left in the thirties
473,000; in the forties 1.7 million, 18 percent of the black population of the
South; in the fifties 1.5 million; in the sixties 1.4 million. The number of blacks
who moved north, about 6.5 million, is greater than the number of Italians or
Irish or Jews or Poles who moved to this country during their great migrations.
Nicholas Lemann, The Origins of the Underclass, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1986, at 31,
39. See generally CARTER G. WOODSON, A CENTURY OF NEGRO MIGRATION (1918).
33. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 26, at 135-36. See generally HOUSING
DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 197-207 (John M. Goering ed.) (1986).
34. Freedman points out that:
It was the hope of the pioneers of public housing that their program would
play an important part in reversing the segregation trend. These pioneers were
liberals whose desire to undertake an attack on bad housing conditions was an
expression of their total system of values. Those values were intrinsically hos-
tile to racial prejudice and discrimination. Through public housing they sought
to build integrated communities that could serve as models for the larger soci-
ety.
FREEDMAN, supra note 26, at 137.
35. See, e.g., Patrice Gaines, Fighting Cold Wars at Home, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1995,
at JI (noting the extent of the problem); Vernon Loeb, Residents Lose Faith in System,
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1995, at J1 (noting that even security guards are not safe in
housing projects).
36. FISHER, supra note 22, at 8-12.
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stricted living accommodations produced violent results.' Crime
and the fear of crime are some of the most acute problems facing
public housing today~s These problems are present in all segments
of society, but in the words of Senator Allan Cranston of California,
"our low-income housing is most profoundly affected. Daily we
hear reports of open drug markets, heavily armed drug dealers,
shadow buyers, and violent death.... Drug-related violence is stul-
tifying the lives of the vast majority of residents...."
Crime is not a new problem in public housing developments;
by some accounts, crime has been common in public housing since
the 1960s.40 However, in recent years the level and intensity of the
violence has accelerated to epidemic proportions. Many public
housing projects are considered drug markets where heavily armed
drug dealers openly ply their trades. It is not uncommon to hear
public housing complexes being referred to as "war zones ' or to
hear reports of residents living in constant fear.44 In short, as
summed up by Senator Sam Nunn, public housing has become a
magnet for drugs and crime. 5
The factors that have engendered crime in cities, and particu-
larly in public housing, are varied and complex." According to
William Julius Wilson, the problems of crime and other patholo-
gies-teenage pregnancy, welfare dependency-prevalent in the
inner cities and in public housing are due to "shifts in the American
economy from manufacturing to service industries, which have
produced extraordinary rates of joblessness in the inner city and ex-
37. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing how those factors con-
tributed to the present state of public housing).
38. W. VICTOR ROUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CRIME
IN PUBLIC HOUSING: A REVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES AND SELECTED CRIME REDUCTION
STRATEGIES, iv (1978).
39. Drugs in Federally Assisted Housing: Hearing on S. 566 Before the Subcomm. on
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
101st Cong. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Federally Assisted Housing Hearing] (statement of
Senator Cranston).
40. See generally Susan J. Popkin et al., Sweeping Out Drugs and Crime: Residents'
Views of the Chicago Housing Authority's Public Housing Drug Elimination Program, 41
CRIME & DELINQ. 73, 73-99 (1995).
41. See generally LANGLEY C. KEYES, STRATEGIES AND SAINTS: FIGHTING DRUGS IN
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING (1992).
42. See Drugs & Public Housing Hearing, supra note 9, at 3 (statement of Senator
Roth); Federally Assisted Housing Hearing, supra note 39, at 1 (statement of Senator
Cranston).
43. JAMES GARBARINO ET AL., No PLACE TO BE A CHILD 1 (1991); Drugs & Public
Housing Hearing, supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Senator Nunn).
44. Federally Assisted Housing Hearing, supra note 39, at 1.
45. Drugs & Public Housing Hearing, supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Senator Nunn).
46. William Julius Wilson, The Urban Underclass in Advanced Industrial Society, in
THE NEW URBAN REALITY 129, 134 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985).
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acerbated conditions generated by the historic flow of migrants, and
to changes in the urban minority age structure and consequent
population changes in the central city.' 47 The confluence of those
factors has produced many destructive effects, one of which is the
proliferation of violent crime.
Another factor contributing to crime in public housing, is the
physical configuration of public housing buildings.48 Researchers
and architects who have focused on the physical characteristics of
public housing have long maintained that the architectural design of
public housing has contributed to its vulnerability to crime and
various social disorders.4 In the 1950s and early 1960s, instead of
continuing to build the low-rise apartments or townhouses charac-
teristic of the early projects, developers began to build high-rise,
cost-efficient housing in poor, high-crime neighborhoods.'
These new buildings lacked secured lobbies that would restrict
access to elevators, stairwells, or apartments, thus inviting strangers
to enter the buildings at will. Developments were built without
"defensible space" or shared public areas that tenants could monitor
from within their own apartments. The lack of shared public areas
contributed to the tenants' sense of insecurity, and disempowered
them from staking a territorial claim in the safety of their environ-
ment. It is not surprising that, as one of the first steps in restoring
public housing in this country, HUD has embarked on a demolition
campaign, replacing old high-rises, architecturally-flawed buildings,
with the town houses of old.5'
Demolishing and restructuring may, to some extent, help ame-
liorate the problem of crime. However, if the findings of William
Julius Wilson are correct-that the majority of the problems facing
public housing are due to endemic sociological forcess 2--other chal-
47. Id. at 159.
48. See generally OSCAR NEWMAN & KAREN A. FRANCK, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, FACTORS INFLUENCING CRIME AND INSTABILITY IN URBAN HOUSING
DEVELOPMENTS (1980).
49. Gilbert A. Rosenthal, Reviving Distressed Communities, J. HOUSING, July-Aug.
1994, at 21; see also Jerry Demuth, More Amenities Built into Rehabbed Public Housing,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 1, 1996, at 4 (reporting that government officials and developers
of new public housing concentrate more on architecture to attract mixed-income
families).
50. See generally Popkin et al., supra note 40, at 73-99.
51. See, e.g., John Ritter, Public Housing is Making an About-Face, USA TODAY, Nov.
15, 1996, at 8A (reporting that low-income high-rises across the United States are
being razed to make room for low-rises, town houses, and single-family dwellings);
Harper's Index: Units of Public Housing the Federal Government Plans to Demolish by the
Year 2000: 100,920, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 17, 1996, at LIS; Gary Martin,
Program is Razing Some of the Worst Housing Projects, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Aug. 30, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9500209.
52. See Wilson, supra note 46, at 134.
[VOL. 2:461
HeinOnline  -- 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 470 1996-1997
SpRING 1997] Fourth Amendment Accommodations
lenges to lowering the incidence of crime in public housing remain.0
These barriers include the amelioration of problems like illicit drugs,
drug trafficking, illicit weapons, and weapons use. The inquiry to
which we must now turn is what constraints the Constitution, spe-
cifically the Fourth Amendment, place upon state actors attempting
to deal with these problems.
II. FROM CAMARA TO ACTON: ADMINISTRATIVE
SEARCHES 4 AND THE WARRANT(LESS) REQUIREMENT
As Fourth Amendment concerns increasingly shift from police-
suspect encounters to administrative and legislative schemes de-
signed to address broad social problems,55 the current trend seems to
be toward making the Fourth Amendment as unobtrusive and ac-
commodating as possible in the face of competing societal
concerns.5 Consequently, it is not surprising that, confronted with
the problems facing public housing, many have argued for an ac-
conmodation between Fourth Amendment privacy rights and the
compelling public need to make public housing projects safer for its
53. See, e.g., Lisa Chedekel, Trials, Triumphs of Moving From Hartford Projects,
HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 17, 1996, at Al (noting that although public housing resi-
dents may move from the housing projects to private homes, some of the problems
they faced in the projects still remain).
54. Administrative searches include governmental inspections of residences and
businesses for code violations other than those made by law enforcement officers in
connection with criminal prosecutions. John W. Collins & Sandra N. Hurd, Warrantless
Administrative Searches: It's Time to Be Frank Again, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 189, 190 (1984).
Unless otherwise noted, this Note's use of the term "administrative search" does not
refer to administrative searches of businesses.
55. Sundby, supra note 13, at 1786 (stating that "Fourth Amendment issues increas-
ingly do not concern unexpected police-suspect street encounters where the police
need fast and ready rules, but involve searches and seizures based on a preexisting
legislative or administrative plan").
56. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 15, at 236-39 (1993) (commenting that the Court
sees Fourth Amendment claimants as second-class citizens and has refused to give the
Fourth Amendment the primacy that it deserves because the Court is so concerned
with making sure that police officers can effectively carry-out their duties); Cornelius
J. O'Brien, Recent Decisions, Constitutional Lau-Fourth Amendment-Warrant and
Probable Cause Requirements, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1167, 1193 (1996) (noting that the
"primary usefulness" of the Court's current Fourth Amendment approach is "in over-
coming absolute individual liberties to serve the moral judgment of those in office or
popular consensus"); Marc A. Stanislawczyk, Note, An Evenhanded Approach to Dimin-
ishing Student Privacy Rights Under the Fourth Amendment: Vernonia School District v.
Acton, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1041 (1996) (commenting that the Court's current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, which is designed to balance individual rights against
governmental needs, has resulted in diminishing individual rights); see also Christian J.
Rowley, Note, Florida v. Bostick The Fourth Amendment-Another Casualty of the War
on Drugs, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 601.
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residents. 7 Some have maintained that given the importance of the
public need presented, the Fourth Amendment can and should ac-
commodate warrantless searches of public housing projects.
This part explores the constitutional bases for that argument.
Underlying Part II is the assumption that there is a trend within the
Court to make the Fourth Amendment more malleable to fit solu-
tions to pressing societal concerns. 9 Part II begins by examining
Camara v. Municipal Court," the case that supposedly serves as the
constitutional foundation for this trend.6 Part II then argues that this
trend is the result of the modern Court's choice of one of two com-
peting interpretations of Camara and the administrative search
exception. Part II examines three Supreme Court cases that have
explored the dynamics involved in balancing a compelling public
need against the privacy rights of the individual to show that, under
the Court's current interpretation, warrantless searches of public
housing would most likely pass constitutional muster. However,
this Part concludes that Camara is capable of a competing interpreta-
tion that would not allow warrantless searches of public housing
under the administrative search exception. Unfortunately, that in-
terpretation is ignored by the current Court. Finally, this Part offers
57. See, e.g., Darryl Fears, Poor Residents Join Forces to Wipe Out Drugs, Violence,
ATLANTA J. & CONSTITUTION, Nov. 26, 1994, at B6 (reporting that the problems of
public housing have so perplexed President Clinton that he "told public housing direc-
tors to consider warrantless searches, gun sweeps and swift evictions of residents who
commit crimes"); Vincent Lane, Public Housing Sweep Stakes, POL'Y REV., Summer
1994, at 68 (explaining why warrantless "building sweeps" are necessary); see also
Erika R. George, Recent Development, The Fourth Amendment's Forcing of Flawed
Choices: Giving Content to Freedom for Residents of Public Housing Resident-Pratt v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994), 30 HARV. C.R1-C.L. L.
REV. 577, 589-91 (1995) (arguing that an overwhelming focus on individual liberty
may prevent courts from adequately dealing with the social and economic conditions
faced by public housing residents); Jason S. Thaler, Note, Public Housing Consent
Clauses: Unconstitutional Condition or Constitutional Necessity?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
1777, 1805 (1995) (maintaining that "the severity of conditions that exist in public
housing projects provide [sic] compelling justification to allow sweeps based on con-
sent clauses"); Steven Yarosh, Comment, Operation Clean Sweep: Is the Chicago Housing
Authority 'Sweeping' Away the Fourth Amendment?, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1103, 1122 (1992)
(arguing that given the conditions existing in public housing, some accommodation
for housing sweeps is necessary).
58. See sources cited, supra note 57.
59. The second half of part II confronts this assumption explicitly, discussing three
cases-Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), and
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)-that open the door to the
proposition that a compelling public need may routinely outweigh compelling privacy
rights of individuals.
60. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
61. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1988); Sundby, supra note 13; see
also Phyllis T. Bookspan Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1991).
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reasons why the privacy interest of public housing residents must be
given primacy over the supposedly compelling public need du jour.
To set the constitutional context for this discussion, let us first
turn to the text of the Fourth Amendment itself. The Fourth
Amendment is written in two clauses.62 The first clause (the
"Reasonableness Clause") protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The second clause (the "Warrant Clause") regulates
the manner and purpose in which warrants are to be issued.6
Determining the relationship between these two clauses has
historically been an area of difficulty for the Supreme Court." The
conventional interpretation argues that the Reasonableness Clause is
defined in part by the Warrant Clause,66 i.e., a search conducted in
the absence of consent and without a warrant is per se unreasonable.
The alternative view argues for an independent reading of the two
clauses.67 A search conducted without a warrant would not be per se
unreasonable; rather, the absence of a warrant would be but one of
many factors determining reasonableness. The Court's current
preference favors (if unenthusiastically) the conventional
interpretation that a warrant is required for searches and seizures
6 8
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
See also Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment's Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1389 (1989).
63. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 3.1(a), at 3-5 (3d ed. 1996); see also Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994).
64. LAFAVE, supra note 63, at 3-5.
65. See Maclin, supra note 15, at 202; Sundby, supra note 61, at 383 (stating that "the
United States Supreme Court has struggled continually, and unsuccessfully, to
develop a coherent analytical framework. . . . Many of the Court's present fourth
amendment ills are symptoms of its failure to meet [the] basic challenges presented by
the fourth amendment's text."); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468-75 (1985) (noting that "[tihe fourth
amendment is the Supreme Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities,"
partly because the Court has continued to adhere to the warrant requirement in
theory, but not in fact).
66. For an argument espousing the conventional interpretation, see Maclin, supra
note 15; see generally John M. Copacino, Suspicionless Criminal Seizures After Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 215, 221-24 (1994) (describing
conventional and alternate interpretations).
67. For an argument presenting the alternative view see Amar, supra note 63, at
757-819; see generally Copacino, supra note 66, at 221-24 (describing conventional and
alternative interpretations).
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unless the search or seizure falls under one of the exceptions to theS 69
warrant requirement.
A. Camara's Legacies
Before 1967, administrative searches-that is searches of
residences and businesses for code violations-were not subject to
the warrant requirement because they were not viewed as
"searches" within the Fourth Amendment meaning of the term.70
Consequently, housing inspectors were free to conduct warrantless
inspections, and inspectees were powerless to stop the searches,
often facing the threat of imprisonment if they dared refuse. Thus, in
Camara v. Municipal Court,7' Roland Camara was arrested and
awaiting trial on the criminal charge that he violated the San
Francisco Housing Code by refusing to allow a warrantless
inspection of his residence.72 An inspector for San Francisco
Department of Public Health, alerted by the building manager that
Camara was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence
in violation of the building occupancy permit, sought access to
Camara's apartment.73 Camara thrice rebuffed the entreaties of
inspectors for the Department of Public Health who sought to
inspect his apartment, because they did not have a warrant.74
Camara was arrested and released on bail. He subsequently
brought suit in California state court seeking a writ of prohibition
against the criminal court, arguing that the ordinance authorizing a
68. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that warrantless
searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions"); see also Bookspan, supra note
61, at 479; Wayne R. LaFave, 'Seizures' Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to
Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 451 (1984)
(remarking that the Court "has often stated a 'preference' for searches pursuant to
warrant"). Although the current law dictates that a warrant is preferred, some com-
mentators argue that given the many exceptions to the warrant requirement there is
not much left to the rule that searches and seizures must be accompanied by a war-
rant. See, e.g., Bookspan, supra note 61, at 503.
69. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). For a laundry list
of exceptions to the warrant requirement, see Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, 83
GEO. L.J. 665, 692 (1995) (discussing exceptions to the warrant requirement in a chap-
ter on warrantless searches and seizures).
70. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
71. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
72. Id. at 525. Camara overturned an earlier decision, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959), in which a homeowner was convicted of violating a municipal code for
refusing to permit a municipal health inspector to enter and inspect his premises
without a search warrant.
73. Camara, 387 U.S. at 526.
74. Id. at 527.
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warrantless inspection of his premises was unconstitutional. The
California courts rejected his argument and he appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. Agreeing with Camara, the Supreme
Court held that the building inspector should obtain a search war-
rant, barring exigent circumstances, once the occupant has denied
him entry.7 The Court concluded that administrative searches were
indeed subject to the warrant requirement because searches
"conducted without a warrant lack the traditional safeguards which
the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual ... ,,76
The issue in Camara (and in Frank, which Camara overruled) is
the same one over which we continue to struggle today; essentially,
to what extent can the Fourth Amendment be enlisted in the fight to
resolve pressing social concerns?" In Camara, the City of San
Francisco argued that the Fourth Amendment should not stand in
the way of the "health and safety of entire urban populations,"
which would be jeopardized were the state unable to conduct
warrantless inspections of premises so that hazards may be
discovered and eradicated.78
Although the Camara Court rejected the state's argument, it was
not because the Court found the argument entirely unsympathetic.79
The Court, however, seemed leery of holding that state actors can
invade an individual's home without regard for the Constitution,
and without review by an uninterested and detached magistrate."o
75. d. at 539.
76. Id. at 534.
77. In Camera, Justice White implied that the essential issue is what role the Fourth
Amendment will play in the states' efforts to deal with important social concerns. Id.
at 525.
78. Id. at 533. A similar argument was made, and accepted, in Frank, 359 U.S. at
371-72. As this Note will discuss, infra, the argument continues to be made today with
increasing success.
79. In an analysis, infra, this Note suggests that the Court defers to the states' public
need argument.
80. The Court stated:
Under the present system, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant
has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved
requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the
inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector
himself is acting under proper authorization.... The practical effect of this
system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the
field.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 532. In that regard the Camara majority would agree with
Professors Maclin and Sundby's contention that underlying the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement is an issue of trust. See Maclin, supra note 15, at 248 (stating that
"the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment... is distrust of discretionary police
power"); Sundby, supra note 13, at 1777 (stating that "the jeopardized constitutional
value underlying the Fourth Amendment [is] that of 'trust' between the government
and the citizenry").
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By the same token, the Court was not interested in erecting the
Fourth Amendment as a roadblock to the state's ability to meet the
needs of the public.
The Court found itself in a quagmire. It realized that the Fourth
Amendment applied to administrative housing inspections-the
direct implications of privacy interests8' would not allow the Court
to so easily dismiss the plaintiff's claim that administrative inspec-
tions were protected under the Fourth Amendment.82 But the Court
also realized that traditional probable cause would not have permit-
ted' the area searches that it felt were so necessary." A compromise
was needed.
Up to this point in the Amendment's history, the Court
regularly emphasized the supremacy of the Warrant clause."
Although the Court had never (nor has ever) said that a warrantless
search is per se invalid under the Fourth Amendment,86 it had
always maintained a strong preference for a warrant. 7 Faced with
the strength of the privacy interests of the plaintiffs, and (perhaps in
the mind of the Court) the equally strong public need interest of the
state, Camara developed a compromise. Camara found its
compromise in a reasonableness balancing test.
While holding that a warrant is required for administrative
inspections, the Court jettisoned the traditional standard for
probable cause-which required individualized suspicion that a
person had either committed or was in the process of committing a
crime-for a more flexible standard of reasonableness.88 The Court
noted that the constitutional mandate of the Fourth Amendment is
81. "[Wle cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these in-
spection cases are merely 'peripheral.' "387 U.S. at 530.
82. "Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that § 503 is contrary to the
Fourth . . . Amendment[] in that it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private
dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a viola-
tion of the Housing Code exists therein." Id. at 527.
83. "The fourth amendment would have precluded the government's power to
conduct area housing inspections, a power all agreed was necessary, if probable cause
required a showing of specific violations for each inspection." Sundby, supra note 61,
at 392.
84. The Camara Court argued that to reject the argument that warrantless inspec-
tions are not governed by the Fourth Amendment "does not justify ignoring the
question whether some other accommodation between public need and individual
rights is essential." 387 U.S. at 534. Later on in the opinion the Court states: "There is
unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only effective
way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by municipal
codes is through routine periodic inspection of all structures." Id. at 535-36.
85. See id. at 528-29; Sundby, supra note 61, at 386.
86. See generally Copacino, supra note 66, at 221.
87. Sundby, supra note 61, at 386.
88. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35; Sundby, supra note 61, at 392.
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not that there be probable cause, but that there be reasonableness. 89
The Court developed a balancing test to determine what should be
considered reasonable; in order to determine what constitutes a
reasonable intrusion into the individual's Fourth Amendment's
interest, the public need to search must be balanced against the
individual's privacy interest.90
Camara held that government investigators conducting searches
pursuant to a regulatory scheme need not adhere to the usual war-
rant or probable cause requirements-individualized suspicion-as
long as their searches are based upon "reasonable legislative or ad-
ministrative standards ". .. ,91 The Court thought that a
reasonableness standard would effectively balance the need to
search against the degree of intrusion upon the individual's privacy
interest.9 It decided that area searches are permissible where admin-
istrative searches are concerned and that certain factors, such as the
passage of time, the nature of the building to be searched, or the
condition of the entire area, can be used to justify the probable cause
to search.93
The Camara Court rested its holding upon three premises. First,
it was persuaded by the long history of judicial acceptance of these
inspection programs.9 4 Second, it thought that the inspection pro-
grams were conducted pursuant to a compelling public interest that
could not be effectively served any other way.9 Third, because the
inspection was not aimed at discovering evidence of crime, the
Court reasoned that in comparison to a more traditional search, an
administrative search "involved a limited invasion of the urban citi-
zen's privacy.9 6
There are several reasons why Camara is a significant opinion.
First, Camara embodies the current (and perhaps long-standing)
89. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35 (stating probable cause to search would exist only if
the search was reasonable, if there was evidence to believe that something would be
found at the place being searched).
90. Id. at 539. Camara's balancing test may not be limited to a search made pursuant
to a warrant, but might also apply to warrantless searches under the recognized ex-
ceptions. The Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the level of required probable
cause is the same for both searches and warrants. Thus, an administrative search case
that falls under the exigent circumstances exception will be evaluated under the more
deferential reasonableness test, not the more demanding traditional probable cause
test.
91. Id. at 538.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 537.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See LaFave, supra note 11, at 464 (discussing the importance of Camara's Fourth
Amendment doctrine).
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struggle over the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. To the ques-
tion of whether the Fourth Amendment is dominated by the
Warrant Clause or by the Reasonableness Clause, Camara answers
that both have a role to play.98 Second, the Camara majority dealt
with the issue of the proper role of the Fourth Amendment in the
face of pressing public needs, to which it again answered that both
the privacy rights of individuals and the public need must be given
effect.99 Hence, they brought administrative searches within the
ambit of the Fourth Amendment. Third, the legacies of Camara, the
reasonableness inquiry and balancing test, are currently the domi-
nant methods for resolving Fourth Amendment conflicts.00
Consequently, Camara set the framework within which these issues
are to be discussed.
Turning to the specific issue at hand, the modern implications
of Camara's balancing test with respect to warrantless searches in
public housing projects are not very clear. Camara may be inter-
preted as having spawned two distinct legacies: on one hand, the
Camara majority was clearly responsive to the state's interest when
that interest involved a compelling public need. Within the opinion
is the notion that an individual's privacy interest must at times give
way to the public's need.' This first interpretation, which this Note
denominates the "public need reinforcing interpretation," is the
dominant interpretation of Camara.
On the other hand, there is a competing interpretation-which
this Note terms the "privacy reinforcing interpretation"-of
Camara's balancing test standard. It is this interpretation which has
been ignored by the current Court. Camara can also be interpreted as
having reaffirmed the concept that the supremacy of one's right of
privacy, particularly in one's own home, continues to reside at the
very core of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, even
in the face of compelling public needs. Camara's willingness to bring
administrative inspections within the control of the Fourth
Amendment, in spite of a compelling public need, can (and perhaps
should) be interpreted to mean that there is a presumption of
individual privacy that government action must overcome.102Moreover, even where the government is able to rebut that
98. Perhaps with a slight edge to the supremacy of the Warrant Clause.
99. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533-34, 538-40.
100. See LAFAVE, supra note 63, at 635.
101. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-40.
102. "The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative searches is
that the public interest demands such a rule .... Of course, in applying any reason-
ableness standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an argument that the
public interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration." Id. at
533.
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presumption, at least within the administrative search context, the
least that the individual is entitled to is a warrant (granted by a
neutral and detached magistrate), albeit on less than traditional
probable cause, but a warrant nonetheless.
B. The Current Approach
The Court's current approach has virtually ignored Camara's
privacy reinforcing interpretation.103 In three opinions, Terry v.
Ohio,"" New Jersey v. T.L.O.,"' and Vernonia School District 47J v. Ac-
ton, 106 the Court has all but determined that the Fourth Amendment
need not be a concern where the state presents a compelling public
need. This section first describes how the Court has established the
supremacy of the public need reinforcing interpretation of Camara.
Using the three cases mentioned above, it shows how the public-
private analysis gives great deference to the public interest portion
of the analysis. This section then articulates what it sees as the dan-
ger of such an approach, and sets forth reasons why the approach is
detrimental to the rights of public housing residents.
We begin with Terry v. Ohio."7 Although Terry is not an admin-
istrative search case, it is instructive for our purposes because it
demonstrates how the Court continued Camara's redefinition of the
probable cause standard and the use of a balancing test to accom-
modate state solutions to perceived threats to safety.
Terry involved a "stop and frisk" of three men by a plainclothes
police officer."8 The officer could not articulate at first why he de-
cided to observe the men."°9 But he continued to watch them until he
suspected that they were "casing" a store and planning a robbery."'
The officer approached the three men and patted them down. Two
of the three were carrying concealed weapons."' The men were ar-
rested and each was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.112
103. See Wayne R. LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth: On Allen's "Process of
'Factualization' in the Search and Seizure Cases", 85 MICH. L. REV. 427, 446 (1986)
(commenting that the "Court's discussion of the 'persuasive factors' in the balance
leaves something to be desired, and reflects just how easy it would be for courts to run
amuck with this balancing test and, in the process, to balance the fourth amendment
away").
104. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
105. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
106. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
107. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
108. Id. at 5-7.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 7.
112. Id.
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Terry presented two issues: (a) whether stops and frisks are
subject to the Fourth Amendment,"3 and (b) whether the officer in
the case unreasonably interfered with the suspects' Fourth
Amendment rights." The Terry Court did not have much difficulty
in deciding that stops and frisks were searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment."5 What is interesting about the Court's
Fourth Amendment analysis is the effect and weight the Court chose
to give to the individual's right of privacy.
The Court determined that even though the officer interfered
with Terry's Fourth Amendment right to personal security, the key
determination is whether that interference was unreasonable. 6 The
Court then stated that in order to assess the reasonableness of the
Officer's conduct it was necessary to balance the governmental in-
terest against the constitutional interests of the individual."7 One
would think that such a grave individual interest, so eloquently de-
fined by the Court,"8 would be given great weight in the balancing
process. But it was not. Instead the Court found the public interest
involved very compelling. The Court stated that in applying the bal-
ancing test "we consider first the nature and extent of the
governmental interests involved."" 9 The interests include the gov-
113. "Our first task is to establish at what point in this encounter the Fourth
Amendment becomes relevant. That is, we must decide whether and when [the offi-
cer] 'seized' Terry and whether and when he conducted a 'search.' " Id. at 16.
114. "We must decide whether at that point it was reasonable for [the] Officer... to
have interfered with petitioner's personal security as he did." Id. at 19.
115. The Court noted that "[tihere is some suggestion in the use of such terms as
'stop' and 'frisk' that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth
Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a 'search' or 'seizure' within
the meaning of the Constitution. We emphatically reject this notion." Id. at 16.
116. Id. at 15.
117. The Court stated that:
In order to assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden's conduct as a gen-
eral proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining rea-
sonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the
invasion which the search (or seizure) entails."
Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).
118. The actual words of the Court were as follows:
It is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure [a stop and frisk] performed
in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a
wall with his hands raised, is a "petty indignity." It is a serious intrusion upon
the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.
Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted).
119. Id.at22.
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ernmental interest in the prevention and detection of crime2' as well
as "the more immediate interest of the police officer" to protect him-
self and to protect potential victims of crime.12 By themselves, these
are quite compelling interests. But consolidated under the rubric of
"public need," the individual cannot win.22 Consequently, the Court
determined that the officer was reasonable in interfering with
Terry's Fourth Amendment privacy right and that Terry lost the bal-
ancing test.
The Court in Terry does not quite explain, however, why Terry
lost the balancing test. Although the Court talks about reasonable-
ness and permissive intrusions, to best understand why Terry lost
out on the balancing test it is important to probe deeper into the
Court's reasoning and identify its primary concerns. In both Terry
and Camara, the respective majority opinions hint at the importance
of accommodating a compelling public need. 123 New Jersey v. T.L.O.'2
is more straightforward.
T.L.O. presented a situation similar to Terry. In T.L.O. a high
school freshman was caught smoking in the bathroom by a teacher
who then took her to the principal's office for violating the school's
rule against smoking in lavatories.125 The student was confronted by
the Assistant Vice Principal and denied that she had been smoking.
The Assistant Vice Principal demanded to see her purse.126 Upon
opening the purse, he noticed rolling papers indicative of mari-
juana. He then performed a more thorough search of the purse
which revealed marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, large sums of one
dollar bills, and letters implicating her in marijuana dealing.128
The relevant issues in T.L.O. were whether warrantless searches
conducted by public school officials are within the purview of the
Fourth Amendment,' and whether the particular warrantless
search in T.L.O. was reasonable. 3 In language analogous to the lan-
guage in Terry v. Ohio,31 the Court determined with little difficulty
that high school students have legitimate expectations of privacy
120. Id.
121. Id. at 23.
122. See Bookspan, supra note 61, at 508.
123. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-27; Camara, 387 U.S. at 533, 536-39.
124. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
125. Id. at 328.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 332-33, 337.
130. Id. at 333-37.
131. 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968).
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with respect to personal property taken to school. 132 The difficult
question was whether their privacy interests were sufficient to pre-
vent searches of their property without a warrant.
33
Once again, quoting Camara,'m the Court maintained that de-
termining what is reasonable depended upon the outcome of the
balancing test.3 5 The refreshing part of the opinion is the honesty
that the Court displays in discussing what it sees as the clash of the
important interests of the individual and of the school.' The Court
is not bashful in noting its concern for the public needy. Moreover,
the Court is also somewhat explicit that its outcome in the case is
dictated by its public need reinforcing concern. 1' Consequently, the
Court held that the balancing test favored the school administrator's
warrantless search of T.L.O.'s purse as reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.'3
132. The Court emphatically supports the privacy rights of children in the schools,
just as they did the rights of suspects on public streets. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 336-38 (1985).
133. Id. at 338.
134. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
135. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (stating that "[oin one side of the balance are arrayed
the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other,
the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order").
136. "Against the child's interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of
teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school
grounds." Id. at 339.
137. In this case, the needs of school teachers and administrators. See id. at 339-40.
138. The Court states:
How, then, should we strike the balance between the schoolchild's legitimate
expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an
environment in which learning can take place? It is evident that the school set-
ting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public
authorities are ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement, in particular, is
unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant be-
fore searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the
criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and in-
formal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in conclud-
ing that the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order
in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that
searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search
has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student
should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of
the search.
Id. at 340-41 (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 347.
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The balancing test was most recently used in Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton 4 with similar results. Acton (and Camara) best
represents the concerns of this Note. Acton is far removed from the
quintessential Fourth Amendment police-suspect case. On its facts,
Acton is the most direct progeny of Camara. The case features an
administrative scheme, designed ex ante, to deal with a compelling
public need. Unlike Terry, however, Acton does not express the
concern about police discretion which typically dominates Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Also unlike Terry (and T.L.O.), there is
not the problem of a government agent on the verge of discovering
potentially incriminating evidence, but without the probable cause
required to conduct a more intrusive search. Acton presented a
Camara-like situation that called for a Camara-like solution.
At issue in Acton was the constitutionality of the Vernonia
School District Student Athlete Drug Policy.141 The Policy required
all students wishing to participate in the district's athletic programs
to consent to a urinalysis at the beginning of each season, for the
purpose of determining the presence of illicit drugs. The Policy
also required students to consent to random drug testing.
4 3
Once again, the Court determined with ease that the Fourth
Amendment is implicated in such searches. The Court held that
"state-compelled collection and testing of urine . . .constitutes a
'search' subject to the demands of the Fourth Amendment.', 44 The
more crucial issue was whether the search was reasonable.
Predictably, the Court announced that "whether a particular
search meets the reasonableness standard 'is judged by balancing its
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' ,145 But what is
the quantum of state interest sufficient to overcome an individual's
privacy rights? 46 The Court defines a compelling public interest as
"an interest which appears important enough to justify the particular
search at hand, in light of other factors which show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.', 47 The
140. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
141. Id. at 2388.
142. Id. at 2389.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2390 (citation omitted).
145. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive's Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617
(1989)).
146. The Court did not rely on one clear theory in determining whether the privacy
interest should be protected. Rather, the Court relied on an amalgamation of theories.
Before engaging in the balancing test, the Court intimated that the search could be
upheld as a "special needs" exception, and that the search in question did not involve
a significant invasion of privacy. 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
147. Id. at 2394-95.
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Court found "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren"
important enough to overcome the students' privacy interests, given
the destructive effects of drugs.'"
The staggering effects of the accommodative sacrifices that are
to be made at the altar of the public need are sufficiently demon-
strated by Terry, T.L.O., and Acton. If these cases are to serve as
binding precedent, the privacy interest of public housing residents
could be seriously undermined. Present-day situations in some
public housing projects present at least as compelling a public need
rationale as was presented by these cases. 49 In the modern world of
public housing, the public health is much less endangered by faulty
wiring and the accumulation of garbage than by the proliferation of
drugs and firearms. s Against the great weight and significant pub-
lic interests of curbing drug use, curtailing the proliferation of
firearms in the projects, and obtaining secure, safe, and decent
housing for public housing residents, these cases would not give the
privacy interest of the public housing resident a fighting chance.
There are additional reasons to be concerned. One can view
these cases as standing for the proposition that the greater the public
need or potential public harm, the lesser the quantum of probable
cause (or reasonable suspicion) required to conduct a search.15' The
impact of these cases is further exacerbated by the prospect that the
148. Id. at 2395.
149. 1993 CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY ANNUAL REPORT 2 ("For the past twenty-
five years, Chicago's public housing residents have lived in communities that have
disintegrated under the weight of poverty and crime.").
150. For example, the average crime rate for Chicago Housing Authority (CHA)
developments in 1993 was 7.7 crimes per 100 persons, based on the 1991 population
(86,547). See 1993 CRIME INCIDENCE IN CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY
DEVELOPMENTS 5.
151. This interpretation may be necessitated by the balancing test required by the
Court. "In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable-and thus in
determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection-
the need for the inspection must be weighed . .." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 535 (emphasis added). The Court also asserts that "there can be no ready test
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails." Id. at 537. The Court maintains that "[i]f a valid
public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to
issue a suitably restricted search warrant." Id. at 539. The implication is that the
greater the public need the more it will weigh in the probable cause determination,
thereby decreasing the probable cause required. See LaFave, supra note 103, at 447
(discussing this possibility); see also Sundby, supra note 61, at 394 (arguing that
"[allowing reasonableness to define probable cause expanded the range of acceptable
government behavior beyond intrusions based on individualized suspicion to include
activities in which the government interest outweighed the individual's privacy inter-
ests").
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greater the public need the more likely it is that the Court will allow
a tremendous intrusion upon the privacy rights of the individual."5 2
Some commentators, fearing these results, have argued that the
error of these cases is the emphasis they place on the reasonableness
inquiry and the balancing test as methods of determining reason-
ableness. Consequently, commentators attribute this error to the
Camara Court primarily, and to its progeny (Terry, T.L.O., and Acton)
generally.
As noted earlier, Camara is capable of another interpretation-
the public need reinforcing interpretation-which dictates that at
times the private interest does need to give way to a compelling
public need. Not surprisingly, that statement does not engender
much controversy from judges, commentators, or activists. What
seems to be controversial is the Court's reasonableness inquiry, as
embodied in the balancing test. The truth is that some mistrust the
Court's method of determining reasonableness to protect individual
privacy rights.153
152. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Jackson stated that:
[Ihf we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment... it seems
to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense. If we as-
sume, for example, that a child is kidnapped [sic] and the officers throw a
roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be
a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be unable
to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I should
candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good
faith, because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it
was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I
should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a
few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.
Id.; see also Amar, supra note 63, at 802 (arguing that "serious crimes and serious needs
can justify more serious searches and seizures"). For criticism of the balancing test see
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635, 639 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[pirecisely because the need for action against the drug
scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great,"
and commenting on the malleability of a balancing search); see also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 944 (1987)
(arguing that "complacency blinds us to serious problems in the mechanics of
balancing"); Kamisar, supra note 6, at 33 (noting that it is not surprising that the
government interests prevail when the balancing test is used. "This is usually the
result when the Court utilizes what dissenters aptly called 'a formless and unguided
"reasonableness" balancing inquiry.' "); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the
Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173, 1188-89 (1988) (maintaining that use of the balancing test
contributes to the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights); Sundby, supra note 61, at 400
(arguing that the balancing test favors government intrusion).
153. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 56, at 1192 (commenting that "[t]he Vernonia deci-
sion is an illustration of the inadequacy of the Court's balancing test to preserve the
Fourth Amendment rights of individuals").
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As a practical matter, there are problems with the Court's bal-
ancing method. In the public housing context, for example, the
mechanics of the balancing test are difficult to administer. The bal-
ancing test requires that one weigh the public need against the
individual's privacy interest. One must be able to separate the indi-
vidual's privacy interest(s) from the government's interest(s), place
them on opposite sides of an (imaginary) constitutional scale, and
with a sagacious constitutional eye, scrupulously ascertain which
side is most weighty. Even if we engage in the fiction that such an
analysis is possible, in the difficult set of cases with which we are
concerned-i.e., those involving conflicts between compelling public
needs and compelling individual privacy rights--one problem still
remains: in the context of warrantless searches of public housing
projects, there are no clearly separable interests.
The public housing resident is often simultaneously the target
of governmental investigation and the recipient of governmental
protection. In a case where the resident is the victim of a crime, for
example, the resident's and the state's interests are closely aligned.
The state seeks to apprehend the perpetrator of the crime to protect
the public, vindicate the public laws, and bring the criminal to jus-
tice. The victim presumably wants to see the law-breaker
apprehended and convicted for similar and personal reasons. In
such cases the public's interest and the individual's interest are
parallel.
Conversely, when the resident is the target of a criminal inves-
tigation ostensibly arising from his activities around the public
housing project, he does not see his fate aligned with that of the
government. He is not concerned with the vindication of the pub-
lic laws or the protection of the public; he is primarily concerned
with staying out of the grasp of the state-and if he is brought to
trial, avoiding conviction. He sees his interests as antagonistic to
those of the public, and by proxy, the government. In that instance
the Fourth Amendment's purpose is clear: it ensures that the gov-
ernment can protect the public and enforce its laws without
infringing upon the privacy interests of the individual.
Unfortunately, the issue of warrantless searches of public
housing does not provide such a neat division of interests. Conse-
quently, a traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test is not fully
154. Because this hypothetical assumes that a crime is committed, one might argue
that an innocent resident would not have the same feelings as a not-so-innocent resi-
dent. However, such an argument would ignore the dual and conflicting relationship
of certain segments of the population with the police (e.g., African Americans). See
Angela Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 438 (1997)
(exploring this dual relationship by explaining that racially discriminatory traffic stops
negatively impact both those African Americans who are factually guilty and those
who are factually innocent).
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workable. Public housing residents are both the targets of warrant-
less searches and the recipients of their potential protection. As the
object or target of a governmental investigation, the public housing
resident is interested in the protection of the privacy of his home,
and in making sure that he is accorded the full complement of rights
due a citizen living in a democratic society. These interests are ar-
guably antagonistic to the means that the government seeks to use-
a warrantless search. However, as the subject of governmental pro-
tection, the resident's interests are also more or less aligned with the
governmental interest because the government seeks to protect the
resident's personal safety. This phenomenon is demonstrated by the
fact that the majority of public housing residents in Chicago favored
warrantless searches of their public housing complexes in spite of
the fact that they would have to bear, at the very least, the costs inci-
dent to the loss of privacy. 5
Even if it were possible to divide the private and public inter-
ests clearly, balancing them fairly would present problems. First,
there seems to be a sense that the harm to an individual's privacy
interest is more of a psychic harm, whereas if the public need to
conduct a search is frustrated, the harm is thought to be more physi-
cal, more palpable. Second, there is also a sense that the individual
benefits whenever the public need for a search is fulfilled. Hence,
individuals are at least partially compensated for whatever harm
they suffer from violation of their (psychic) privacy rights.
There is a third and related problem, which is most likely in-
herent in the nature of the balancing process itself. Balancing an
individual's right of privacy (or right to be free from government
interference) against the public interest is essentially an invitation to
engage in an exercise in balancing comparative harms. Fundamen-
tally, the relevant inquiry is who will be harmed the most, the
individual (if the search in question is permitted) or the public inter-
est (if the search is not permitted)? This is an exercise in which the
individual begins with an abstract disadvantage. It is one individual
against the public. Why should the privacy rights of one individual
outweigh a need of the entire public?15
155. See Lane, supra note 57, at 70 (noting that eighteen of nineteen building presi-
dents and an "overwhelming majority of residents" supported building sweeps). But
see Pratt v. Chicago Housing Authority, 838 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting that
some Chicago Housing Authority project residents opposed warrantless searches be-
cause of the burden on their right to privacy).
156. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 13, at 1765 (making a similar point); see also Amitai
Etzioni, Balancing Act: Don't Sacrifice the Common Good to Personal 'Rights,' CHI. TRIB.,
May 16, 1994, § 1, at 11 (arguing that although there may be detrimental effects on
individual rights, warrantless sweeps are necessary for the common good of public
housing residents).
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While acknowledging that there are problems with the Court's
reasonableness test and balancing act approach, this Note's criticism
is a much narrower one. Its contention is simply that the current
approach has misinterpreted Camara. Camara has erroneously been
given effect only as a public need reinforcing mechanism. The
context within which Camara arose has been ignored, and the
balance that Camara struck has been abandoned. Camara's privacy
reinforcing component has all but disappeared from the Fourth
Amendment landscape.
Camara is best understood, and best categorized, as an
administrative search case. Administrative searches involve planned
searches by government (although non-police) personnel pursuant
to a predetermined scheme designed to deal with a societal
problem. 57 This scenario is different from the police search designed
to uncover evidence of criminal activity."' In that respect Camara is
different from Terry. Terry involved the usual police-suspect
encounter within the context of the criminal law. The search there
was "unplanned" and the concern for police discretion and safety
paramount and possibly understandable. The Court in Terry, while
holding that brief stops constitute searches, could have easily
disposed of the warrantless search under its doctrine of exigent
circumstances or special needs (safety of the officer). Instead, the
Court invoked the Camara reasonableness balancing test.
Camara and Acton did not involve a police-suspect encounter.
The searches were planned pursuant to legislative and
administrative schemes, respectively. The concern was social and
the methods chosen were administrative or civil. The Camara
opinion itself demonstrates that the Court understood that
administrative searches were contextually different from the usual
police-suspect encounters.
First, the Court acknowledged that the purpose of administra-
tive searches were not to uncover criminal activity.', 9 Second, the
Court recognized that these types of cases almost always involved a
clash of important interests, that of the public and that of the indi-
vidual.160 Third, the Court realized the difficulty of obtaining
157. See, e.g., Federally Assisted Housing Hearing, supra note 39, at 103, 117-26
(statement of Vincent Lane, Chairman, Chicago Housing Authority) (describing the
CHA administrative searches of public housing complexes).
158. An administrative search can turn up evidence of criminal activity, akin to the
police search. However, the emphasis of the administrative search is not criminal, but
social. In the public housing context, for example, an administrative search for lease
violations may turn up evidence of drug-dealing. Yet, the purpose of the search is not
to find evidence of drug-dealing, but rather to insure the habitability of the housing
complex for all residents.
159. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
160. Id. at 534-35.
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individualized suspicion. Fourth, and most importantly, the Court
understood that the planned nature of the searches allowed gov-
ernment officials the ability to plan on acquiring a warrant with little
difficulty. Emphasizing the need for an intermediary to review the
government's justification for the administrative search scheme, ex
ante, the Court ruled that the government would have to acquire a
warrant, albeit on less than probable cause.'61 Following the way
highlighted by Camara, one can see why Acton is so troubling.
Many commentators find Acton unsatisfactory,1 and justifiably
so. The opinion is lacking in both analysis and result. The Court
wants us to believe that school children who participate in athletics
have a reduced expectation of privacy because, inter alia, "they must
acquire adequate insurance coverage or sign an insurance waiver,
maintain a minimum grade point average," etc. 16 The Court then
argues that state-compelled urinalysis is really not such a big deal; it
is just like using the restroom, "which men, women, and especially
school children use daily.""' Finally, the Court emphasized the im-
portance of deterring drug use by the nation's schoolchildren.'6 s
It is unfortunate that the Court got so carried away by this
"immediate crisis of great[] proportions,"' 6  otherwise known as the
public need, that it failed to conduct a satisfactory analysis. Follow-
ing the dictate of Camara-that the public need and the privacy right
of the individual must be given effect-the analysis is quite simple.
161. For a discussion of the responsibilities of judicial officers with respect to ad-
ministrative warrants, specifically administrative warrants for housing inspection
programs, see LaFave, supra note 97, at 465 (suggesting that there are two roles for
judicial officers in passing upon administrative warrants: "(1) a general determination
of the reasonableness of the inspection program; and (2) a specific determination of
whether the particular inspection requested fits within that program"). Although a
warrant can be issued on less than probable cause, a judicial officer performing these
two roles provides the resident some protection against arbitrary searches.
162. See Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment: Confes-
sions of a Patron Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2580 (1996). See generally Irene M.
Rosenberg, Public School Drug Testing: The Impact of Acton, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 349
(1996); Carla E. Laszewski, Note, Gone to Pot: Student Athletes' Fourth Amendment
Rights After Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 575 (1996); Jennifer
L. Malin, Comment, Vemonia School District 47J v. Acton: A Further Erosion of the
Fourth Amendment, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 469 (1996); Stanislawczyk, supra note 56.
163. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2393 (1995). As some com-
mentators have noted, this Fourth Amendment diminishment of student privacy
rights in the public schools is in contradiction with the way students' rights have been
viewed with respect to other areas of the Constitution. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note
162, at 363 (noting that the Acton majority ignored other doctrines of constitutional law
dealing with the rights of children); Malin, supra note 162, at 503-05 (commenting that
constitutional developments in students' rights with respect to free expression, pri-
vacy, and due process conflict with the Court's holding in Acton).
164. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
165. Id. at 2395.
166. Id.
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The first inquiry is whether the warrantless searches are part of an
administrative scheme. The next inquiry is whether traditional
probable cause is unattainable given the circumstances. Where tra-
ditional probable cause is attainable, Camara demands that it be
acquired in the administrative context. Even if traditional probable
cause is impracticable, however, the solution is not a blanket, ran-
dom search, but a warrant on less than traditional probable cause.
As the Fourth Amendment figures increasingly in attempts to
deal with indomitable social problems, it is important for the Court
to settle on a workable framework. The Camara framework seems to
provide the most promise, especially in the context of public hous-
ing.
III. CONSENT
As mentioned in Part I, the Court has found in the doctrine of
consent searches and seizures an important tool in the fight to
eliminate threats to public safety. It is not surprising that the consent
doctrine has been invoked as an axiomatic device necessary to win
the war against drugs and crime in public housing complexes.
The idea of consent searches and seizures gained national
prominence when President Clinton and his administration sug-
gested bypassing the Fourth Amendment altogether, through the
insertion of consent clauses in public housing lease agreements, in
order to conduct warrantless searches of public housing com-
plexes. 167 The Clinton Administration developed a multiple-point
167. President's Radio Address, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 822, 823-24 (Apr.
16, 1994). The President's suggestion was a reaction to a recent ruling issued in Pratt v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994), where a District Court
Judge, Warren Andersen, ruled the Chicago Housing Authority's building sweeps
unconstitutional. In September of 1988, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) began
what it called "Operation Clean Sweep" (Sweeps). The Sweeps were characterized by
systematic door-to-door searches of every apartment in a targeted building, in pursuit
of drugs, illegal residents, and unlicensed firearms. See Federally Assisted Housing
Hearing, supra note 39, at 103, 117-26 (statement of Vincent Lane, Chairman, Chicago
Housing Authority). The program was created in response to the high levels of violent
crime in federally-financed public housing projects, as well as the public outcry calling
for a quicker response to the epidemic of violence. Id.
On April 7, 1994, the Sweeps were halted when Judge Andersen ruled that the
CHA's search policy violated the Fourth Amendment and enjoined CHA officials
from continuing these searches. Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793. Following the court order,
President Clinton instructed Attorney General Janet Reno and Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development Henry Cisneros to develop law enforcement measures that
would be both constitutionally valid and effective in reducing crime in public housing
projects. See President's Radio Address, supra.
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option plan.'" Of the options developed, one of the most popular
and controversial is the recommendation that consent clauses be in-
serted in leases of public housing residents. In a letter to the
President, Attorney General Janet Reno and Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development Henry Cisneros wrote:
A search is lawful if it is conducted pursuant to an
uncoerced consent. Leases in housing projects, as
elsewhere, typically include a standard consent clause
permitting the housing authority to conduct routine
maintenance inspections and to enter the tenant's
apartment in case of emergency. Where crime conditions
in the housing development make unit-by-unit inspections
essential, similar lease consent clauses could be employed
to authorize periodic administrative inspections of tenants'
units for unlicensed or unauthorized firearms. 169
The proposed use of consent clauses in public housing leases
thus presents the question of whether the insertion of these consent
clauses will serve to effectively bypass the Fourth Amendment. Part
III contends that although consent is an important accommodative
tool, the consent inquiry as currently articulated by the Supreme
Court is a fictitious and inutile inquiry in the administrative context.
This Note argues that the rules that the Court has developed for
use in the police-suspect context should not be carried over into the
administrative context, because the justifications that gave rise to
those rules--e.g., need for police discretion, unpredictably of police-
suspect encounters, etc.-are not applicable in the administrative
context. This Note maintains that the Court's consent inquiry re-
flects a concern for one of two competing values. On one hand, there
is concern that "the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of
unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal police
tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of jus-
tice."'7° On the other hand, the Court does not want to handicap the
police unnecessarily or unduly to limit the investigative tools that
the police have available to them. This Note argues that the Court's
current consent inquiry is a genuflect to the latter value, while ignor-
ing the former.
Without passing upon the merits of the Court's consent
inquiry-that is, whether focusing on cabining police behavior is an
appropriate normative inquiry-this Note admits that the inquiry is
168. Cisneros and Bryson Briefing on Public Housing Sweeps (Apr. 16, 1994), avail-
able in 1994 WL 130857.
169. 140 CONG. REC. S4660 (1994).
170. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1972).
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sensible in the police-suspect context. In other words, if the Fourth
Amendment guards against anything, it must at least guard against
abusive police behavior.17' However, in the administrative context,
the inquiry can and should mean more. Consent to search
agreements in the administrative context should be analyzed in
terms of discrete units of explicit bargains in which the original
terms, as evidenced by the text of the Fourth Amendment and
current Fourth Amendment doctrine, are renegotiated. The essential
issue is whether there are any constitutional limits to the extent of
the renegotiations.
Part III.A develops the intellectual framework within which the
discussion takes place. Part III.B maps the Court's current
formulation of the consent doctrine, specifically highlighting the
Court's concern with developing rules that work in the police-
suspect context. This Part also argues that the Court's current
consent inquiry cannot be carried over to the administrative context
because the justifications undergirding the Court's current inquiry,
which are concerned with police-suspect behavior, are not present in
the administrative context. Part III.C provides other, more
constitutional alternatives.
A. Conceptual Framework
Before discussing the Court's consent doctrine, it is necessary to
establish the intellectual context. In a classic article, entitled Two1172
Models of the Criminal Process, Professor Herbert Packer describes
two competing models of the criminal justice system, that permit
one "to recognize explicitly the value choices that underlie the de-
tails of the criminal process." 173 He called these two models the
Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model.' 74
According to Professor Packer, the Crime Control Model "is
based upon the proposition that the repression of criminal conduct
is by far the most important function to be performed by the crimi-
nal process.'' 7 5 The necessary elements of the Crime Control Model
are efficiency, speed, and finality.'76 Efficiency is the method
171. That may not be all it guards against. In the context of police-suspect encoun-
ters, however, a consent doctrine that protects individuals from having the police beat
out of them an agreement to search their person or a particular place, for example,
cannot be thought to be unreasonable.
172. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1964).
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id. at 6.
175. Id. at 9.
176. Id. at 10.
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whereby the "criminal process operates to screen suspects, deter-
mine guilt, and secure appropriate dispositions of persons convicted
of crime; ' 177 speed demands police-suspect interactions be kept in-
formal and uniform; 178 and finality requires that once a person has
been convicted, opportunities for disturbing that conviction be kept
at a minimum. 79
In the Crime Control Model, the police operate as important
and central actors. 80 They perform the initial investigation and
screening to determine those who they have reason to believe are
guilty or innocent, an important function in the Model. 8 Because
they are the sole arbiters of probable guilt or innocence, if the Crime
Control Model is to be effective, the screening process operated by
the police must be reliable, or least it must be perceived to be reli-
able.8 2 As Professor Packer states, the Model "places heavy reliance
on the ability of investigative.., officers, acting in an informal set-
ting in which their distinctive skills are given full sway, to elicit and
reconstruct a tolerably accurate account of what actually took place
in an alleged criminal event.""
Professor Packer explains that the Due Process Model is eva-
nescent and a bit more difficult to grasp.'4 The model emphasizes
the importance of protecting the factually innocent at least as much
as convicting those who are guilty. Its constituent elements are a
distinctive distrust of the informal, nonadjudicative, and police-
initiated fact-finding process; 86 the "concept of the primacy of the
individual[;] and the complementary concept of limitation on offi-
cial power.
'
,1
87
The essence of the Due Process Model, however, is the concep-
tion that the Fourth Amendment is an integral part of the
Constitution. A violation of the Fourth Amendment is a violation of
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 10-11.
182. See id. at 11.
183. Id. at 14.
184. "The ideology of due process is far more deeply impressed on the formal
structure of the law than is the ideology of crime control; yet an accurate tracing of the
strands of which it is made is strangely difficult." Id.
185. Id. at 15. Professor Packer notes: "The Due Process Model... comes eventually
to incorporate prophylactic and deterrent rules that result in the release of the factu-
ally guilty even in cases in which blotting out the illegality would still leave an
adjudicative fact-finder convinced of the accused's guilt." Id. at 18.
186. Id. at 14-15.
187. Id. at 16.
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the Constitution. 8 Professors Macin and Sundby remind us that
"integral to the Constitution and our societal view of government is
a reciprocal trust between the government and its citizens" 89 and a
concomitant "distrust of discretionary police power. '19° The Due
Process Model seeks to preserve that trust by rejecting the Crime
Control Model's reliance on informality and reflects a distrust of
police discretionary powers by being mistrustful of police investiga-
tory procedures.1 9'
Borrowing from Professors Packer, Macin, and Sundby, the
Due Process Model can be summed up as reflecting the notion that
the Constitution, and more specifically, the Fourth Amendment, re-
quires that certain formal processes are observed before state power
can be legitimately exercised over an individual. 92 Moreover, be-
cause of its suspicious regard for official assertions of power, the
model regards with a dim eye state failures to observe these formal193 .
processes. It is with both of these models in mind that we now
turn to the Court's consent doctrine.
B. Consent Under the Fourth Amendment
This section explores the Court's current consent doctrine using
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,'94 Florida v. Bostick,'95 and a hypothetical
based on Wyman v. James.196 It argues that the Court's current con-
sent doctrine is oriented toward the Crime Control Model, which is
most relevant to the police-suspect context.
188. "Because the Due Process Model is basically a negative model, asserting limits
on the nature of police power and on the modes of its exercise, its validating authority
is judicial and requires an appeal to supra-legislative law, to the law of the
Constitution." Id. at 22.
189. Sundby, supra note 13, at 1777 (citation omitted).
190. Maclin, supra note 15, at 248.
191. Packer, supra note 172, at 13-22.
192. Professor Packer notes that:
Power is always subject to abuse, sometimes subtle, other times, as in the
criminal process, open and ugly. Precisely because of its potency in subjecting
the individual to the coercive power of the state, the criminal process must, on
this model, be subjected to controls and safeguards that prevent it from operat-
ing with maximal efficiency.
Id. at 16; see also id. at 18.
193. Id. at 16.
194. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
195. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
196. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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1. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Origins of the
Consent-as-Coercion Doctrine
Consent is an attractive option as a law-enforcement technique
because it is a specifically established exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.1 97 The
Supreme Court has interpreted consent to search rather broadly.98
Although consent is constitutionally valid only when it is given
voluntarily, 9 the essential issue is determining what voluntariness
means within the Fourth Amendment.
That issue was first addressed by the Supreme Court in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte ° In Bustamonte, the defendant's car was
stopped when an officer observed that one of the headlights and a
license plate light were burned out.20' The defendant was one of six
passengers in the car.202 After stopping the car, the officer asked an-
other passenger (who stated that his brother owned the car) if he
would consent to a search of the vehicle.0 3 The second passenger
responded, "Sure, go ahead. 2° As a result of the search, the officer
found checks earlier reported to have been stolen, and the defendant
was charged with possessing a check with the intent to defraud.05
The central question raised by Bustamonte was whether the sec-
ond passenger voluntarily consented to the search of the car.' °6 The
Court stated that the test for establishing voluntariness is whether
consent was "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker,, 20 7 a question of fact to be determined from all
of the surrounding circumstances.20 ' The Court determined that
there were two competing factors involved in ascertaining the vol-
untariness of consent.2°9 First, the legitimate need for the type of
197. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
198. The person consenting does not have to be informed that she has the right not
to consent; Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248-49. The waiver of consent does not necessarily
have to be knowing and intelligent. Id. at 241. The fact that person giving consent is
under the influence of drugs or intoxicated or emotionally impaired does not neces-
sarily render consent involuntary. United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1297 (8th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985).
199. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996).
200. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
201. Id. at 220.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 219-20.
206. "The precise question in this case, then, is what must the prosecution prove to
demonstrate that a consent was 'voluntarily' given." Id. at 223.
207. Id. at 225.
208. Id. at 226-27, 248.
209. Id. at 227.
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search for which consent is being sought must be considered.10 Sec-
ond, there must be an absence of coercion. 21' Given the fact that the
government interest will almost always be legitimate, by default, the
major factor governing the consent inquiry is essentially whether the
consent-seeker has engaged in any coercive behavior that would
212
render the giving of consent involuntary.
The focus on coercion was not by any means a foregone
conclusion. 1' Although the Supreme Court had earlier decided, in
Davis v. United States,21 4 that consent is an established exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment,21 and had also held in Bumper v. North Carolina21 6 that
consent must be freely and voluntarily given in order to be valid, 217 it
was not until Bustamonte that the Court was provided with an
opportunity to define the meaning of consent and voluntariness
within the Fourth Amendment.219 Having no Fourth Amendment
precedent from which to draw, the Court turned to the Fifth
Amendment coerced-confession cases and Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process cases, where the problem of coercion had been
addressed as early as 1936 in Brown v. Mississippi.
219
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. The Bustamonte Court stated:
Our decision today is a narrow one. We hold only that when the subject of a
search is not in custody and the state attempts to justify a search on the basis of
consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate
that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or
coercion, express or implied.
Id. at 248; see also 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.1(a), at 602 (3d ed. 1996) (maintaining that this result is ne-
cessitated by the Court's exclusive focus on voluntariness without regard for the
importance of unknowing surrenders of Fourth Amendment rights).
213. The Court was also presented with the argument that consent is only validly
procured where the consent-giver knows that he has a right to refuse consent.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 223, 232-34, 248-49. Had the Court agreed with that argument,
knowledge of the right to refuse consent, as opposed to coercion, would have been the
capstone of the constitutional violation.
214. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
215. Id. at 593-94; Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 219.
216. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
217. Id. at 548.
218. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 219.
219. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown, three Black men, "all ignorant Negroes," were
beaten and hanged by a mob of White men, including police officers, until they con-
fessed and agreed to a version of the crime as dictated by their torturers. Id. at 278-83.
The defendants were tried and convicted in the state courts of Mississippi. Id. at 279-
80. The defendants attempted to exclude their confessions at the trial court, the only
evidence against them, and also attempted to have the convictions overturned on ap-
peal, all to no avail. Id. They then successfully appealed to the United States Supreme
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The definition of voluntariness in the confession cases, the
Court noted, "reflected an accommodation of the complex of values
implicated in police questioning of a suspect., 2 0 At one end of the
spectrum are the values reflected in the Crime Control Model, such
as "the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for the
effective enforcement of criminal laws., 221 At the other end of the
spectrum are the values underlying the Due Process Model, specifi-
cally "the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the
criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that
the possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real
and serious threat to civilized notions of justice. 222 Thus, the pur-
pose of the voluntariness definition in the coerced confession cases
is an attempt to accommodate the values of the Crime Control
Model, as well as the values of the Due Process Model.
Without quite examining whether the balance struck by the co-
erced confession cases can be carried over to the Fourth Amendment
domain, and without deciding whether the definition of voluntari-
ness as the absence of coercion (designed to respond to the peculiar
evil of physically coerced confessions) can be molded to respond to
the perceived evils being protected against by the Fourth Amend-
ment's consent doctrine, the Court incorporated wholesale the Fifth
Amendment's concern for coercion into the Fourth Amendment.22 3 It
is beyond the scope of this Note to address the issue of whether the
Fourth Amendment's consent doctrine is animated by different val-
ues than the Fifth Amendment's coerced confessions doctrine. This
Note's inquiry is much narrower. It only intends to show that the
Court's Fourth Amendment consent doctrine reflects the bias to-
ward the Crime Control Model found at present in the Supreme
Court's Fifth Amendment coerced confession jurisprudence.
Court, arguing that the convictions, procured on the basis of coerced confessions,
were not consistent with due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
287.
220. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 224-25.
221. Id. at 225.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 227.
224. I will not devote much space here to the proposition that the coerced
confession cases are biased in favor of the Crime Control Model, given the plethora of
commentary essentially positing the same assertion. See Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a
Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59
TENN. L. REV. 1, 6 ("It appears ... that a majority of the Justices have embarked on a
campaign to replace the basic idea that the Fourth Amendment sets out an enforceable
right with the notion that the amendment merely authorizes the courts to regulate...
the most blatant instances of police misconduct."); Sheri L. Johnson, Confessions,
Criminals and Community, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 327, 341 (1991) (noting that "the
due process/crime control balance is clearly shifting" in favor of the "growing crime
control contingent"); Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth
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As mentioned above, the Bustamonte majority's focus on coer-
cion was not at all dictated by the facts of the case or by Fourth
Amendment precedent.22 The Court was presented with the very
compelling argument that consent in the Fourth Amendment con-
text is a waiver of a person's right. 26 For consent to be legitimate, the
consent-seeker must demonstrate that the consent-giver intelligently
and knowingly waived that right.227 Consciously or subconsciously,
the Court rejected the consent-as-waiver argument because it did
not want to adopt a Due Process Model definition of consent.228 The
Court noted that it had defined consent as a waiver "in the context
of the safeguards of a fair criminal trial."2  Stating that "[tihere is a
vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial
Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 795 (1992) (asking if the majority in
Bustamonte sacrificed the values of the Due Process Model for those of the Crime
Control Model); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying
Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152 (1991) (criticizing the
Court's deference to the Crime Control Model). Compare Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 308 (1991) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding that coerced confessions are subject to the
harmless error analysis because "the central purpose of a criniial trial is to decide the
factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promote[] public respect
for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than
on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error") (quoting Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)), with Packer, supra note 172, at 9 (noting that the
Crime Control Model is animated by the view that the "failure of law enforcement to
bring criminal conduct under tight control" will result in "a general disregard for legal
controls"), Packer, supra note 172, at 10-11 (stating that the goal of the Crime Control
Model is to screen suspects, the probably innocent from the probably guilty, determine
guilt, and dispose of persons convicted of crime), and Packer, supra note 172, at 15
(maintaining that the Crime Control Model is "more lenient in establishing a tolerable
level of error" and "accepts the probability of mistakes up to the level at which they
interfere with the goal of repressing crime, either because too many guilty people are
escaping or ... because general awareness of the unreliability of the process leads to a
decrease in the deterrent efficacy of the criminal law"). But see Daniel G. McAuley, Jr.,
Comment, Rehnquist Loses Battle but Wins War of Harmless Error: Arizona v.
Fulminante, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 175 (1993) (arguing that
Fulminante furthers not only the values of the Crime Control Model, but also some of
the Due Process Model).
225. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
226. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 235.
227. Id.
228. The Court stated:
A strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed to a
criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the greatest possible op-
portunity to utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal
trial. Any trial conducted in derogation of that model leaves open the possibil-
ity that the trial reached an unfair result precisely because all the protections
specified in the Constitution were not provided.
Id. at 241.
229. Id. at 235.
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and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment,"2 30 the
Court dismissed the waiver argument."'
The Court's fear is precisely the aim of the Due Process
Model.23 2 As Professor Packer argued, not only is the Due Process
Model concerned with the overall fairness of the criminal process, it
specifically "insists on the prevention and elimination of mistakes to
the extent possible, '2n and demands in its most rigorous form that
"as long as there is an allegation of factual error that has not re-
ceived an adjudicative hearing in a fact-finding context, ', 23' all of the
possible doctrines and defenses that serve to prevent the use of the
criminal law from being brought to bear on the individual, thereby
enhancing his/her chances of being found legally innocent, must be
brought into play.235 That is the aim of the Due Process Model, which
the Court explicitly rejected in Bustamonte.
The Court seems to favor the Crime Control Model because it
apparently believes that the Crime Control Model best responds to
the contextual needs of the police-suspect domain. In Bustamonte the
Court explained that "[iun situations where the police have some
evidence of illicit activity... a search authorized by a valid consent
may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evi-
dence."237 More poignantly, the Court noted that adopting a consent-
as-waiver definition would be unresponsive to "the circumstances
that prompt the initial request to search ' 238 in the first place. Conse-
230. Id. at 241.
231. Id. at 246. For a particularly pointed criticism of the Court's "crabbed" defini-
tion of consent in Bustamonte, see Maclin, supra note 224, at 792-95.
232. Compare Professor Packer's description of the Due Process Model, beginning
supra note 185, with the Court's reasoning for rejecting the consent-as-waiver defini-
tion, supra note 228.
233. Packer, supra note 172, at 15.
234. Id. at 14.
235. Id. at 17.
236. Throughout the opinion, the Court rejects the values of the Due Process Model
in favor of those of the Crime Control Model. Compare Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 231-32
("Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law enforce-
ment agencies. They normally occur... under informal and unstructured conditions.
The circumstances that prompt the initial request to search may... be a logical exten-
sion of investigative police questioning."), and id. at 229 (noting that the adoption of
the consent-as-waiver argument "would, in practice, create serious doubt whether
consent searches could continue to be conducted"), with Packer, supra note 172, at 10-
13 (noting the Crime Control Model's preference for informal processes and to have
as few restrictions as possible placed upon police administrative and investigatory
fact-finding).
237. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227.
238. Id. at 232 ("The circumstances that prompt the initial request to search may
develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police questioning. The po-
lice may seek to investigate further suspicious circumstances or to follow up leads
developed in questioning persons at the scene of a crime.").
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quently, "[it would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal,
unstructured context of a consent search, a policeman, upon pain of
tainting the evidence obtained, could" administer the requirements
of a consent-as-waiver regime.239 Given the consent doctrine's Crime
Control bias, the only necessary inquiry-in ascertaining whether
consent has been lawfully given-is whether consent has been ob-
tained as a result of the consent-seeker's unlawful coercive tactics.
Florida v. Bostick 240 is illustrative.
2. Florida v. Bostick: Implications of the
Consent-as-Coercion Doctrine
In Bostick, two officers boarded a bus en route to Atlanta from
Miami that stopped at Fort Lauderdale.4 Unfortunately for Bostick,
the police officers, -without articulable suspicion, picked him out
and asked him for his identification and ticket.243 Although the offi-
cers did not find anything remarkable with respect to Bostick's ticket
and identification, they nevertheless, after identifying themselves as
police officers, asked for his consent to search through his luggage.
Needless to say, they found illicit narcotics and arrested Bostick. 4,
The issue presented in Bostick was whether "a police encounter
on a bus.., constitutes a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment., 246 Put differently, the issue can be restated as whether
Bostick consented to carrying on this tCte-A-tCte with the police offi-
cers. The Court quickly sets out its broad objective: "Our cases make
it clear that a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer
approaches an individual and asks them a few questions[,] [s]o long
as a reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and
go about his business.' ,,24 The Court's task, as it saw it, was to de-
239. Id. at 245.
240. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). Bostick is not a consent-to-search case. However, the focus
here is not on consenting to searches, but on consensual encounters. Bostick is interest-
ing because it illustrates very nicely how the consent inquiry fails to recognize the
coercion experienced by the person giving consent.
241. Id. at 431-32.
242. Although the majority maintained that the officers did not have an articulable
suspicion for picking out Bostick, the dissent noted that "at least one officer who rou-
tinely confronts interstate travelers candidly admitted that race is a factor influencing
his decision whom to approach.... Thus, the basis of the decision to single out par-
ticular passengers during a suspicionless sweep is less likely to be inarticulable than
unspeakable." Id. at 441-42 n.1.
243. Id. at 431-32.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 432.
246. Id. at 433.
247. Id. at 434 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)).
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termine whether a reasonable person in Bostick's situation would, in
essence say to the police officers, "go fly a kite, I do not want to talk
to you.
248
As articulated by the Court, this is quite a broad inquiry. How-
ever, no sooner does the Court state this broad objective than it
engages in the truer and narrower consent inquiry: "[o]nly when the
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
'seizure' has occurred."24 9 The focus is quickly shifted from the co-
ercive forces faced by a reasonable person in Bostick's situation to
the coercive conduct of the consent-seeker, in this case the officers.
This shift in focus by the majority changes the relative significance
of the issues.
The majority found "[t]wo facts [that] are particularly worth
noting. First, the police specifically advised Bostick that he had a
right to refuse consent. Second, at no time did the officers threaten
Bostick with a gun., 25 0 Notice how the Court's inquiry automatically
forces it to focus not on the coercive forces faced by Bostick but on
whether, in seeking consent, the consent-seekers behaved coercively
toward the consent-giver. The fact that Bostick was on a bus and his
liberty was constrained does not warrant much importance. Nor
does the fact that the bus' departure was most likely imminent play
a significant role in the calculation. On the contrary, the majority
maintained that:
[T]he mere fact that Bostick did not feel free to leave the
bus did not mean that the police seized him. Bostick was a
passenger on a bus that was scheduled to depart. He
would not have felt free to leave the bus even if the police
had not been present. Bostick's movements were
"confined" in a sense, but this was the natural result of his
decision to take the bus; it says nothing about whether or
not the police conduct at issue was coercive.251
The Court's justification for not finding that a seizure occurred
confuses choice with consent. The Court's justification can be sum-
marized as such: because Bostick chose to board a bus, a vehicle
with an inherent problem of confinement, he therefore consented to
the confining characteristics of the bus. So, the Court maintains,
"Bostick's freedom of movement was restricted by a factor inde-
pendent of police conduct-i.e., by his being a passenger on a bus.
248. Id. at 433-34.
249. Id. at 434.
250. Id. at 432.
251. Id. at 436.
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Accordingly, the 'free to leave' analysis on which Bostick relies is
inapplicable. One can imagine a similar argument being made in
the public housing context: because these residents chose to live in
public projects so fraught with violence that warrantless searches are
necessitated, they consented to the necessity of the searches.
The dissenters took a different approach that deserves to be
analyzed. First of all, the dissenters laid claim to the proper scope of
the inquiry. Justice Marshall, writing for the dissenters stated: "I
agree that the appropriate question is whether a passenger who is
approached during ... a sweep 'would feel free to decline the offi-
cers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.' ,,2"3 He then
goes on to posit what he thinks are the relevant facts necessitated by
the inquiry.
Justice Marshall's analysis is a two-step approach. First, he de-
scribes the nature of the police activity,2s4 and second, he ascertains
the effect of the police behavior on Bostick.255 In addition, Justice
Marshall attacks the majority's consent analysis as equating choice
with consent. Justice Marshall found the majority's analysis prob-
lematic because it enables the consent-seeker to capitalize on the
252. Id.
253. Id. at 444.
254. Justice Marshall maintains: "At issue in this case is a 'new and increasingly
common tactic in the war on drugs': the suspicionless police sweep of buses in intra-
state or interstate travel." Id. at 440. He describes the modus operandi of police
sweeps: "Typically under this technique a group of state or federal officers will board
a bus while it is stopped at an intermediate point on its route," id. at 441, sometimes
they flash their 'badges, weapons or other indicia of authority, the officers identify
themselves and announce their purpose to intercept drug traffickers," id. These
sweeps are often conducted without articulable suspicion as they are often conducted
dragnet style. Id. Moreover, "[blecause the bus is only temporarily stationed at a point
short of its destination, the passengers are in no position to leave as a means of evad-
ing the officers' questioning." Id. at 442. Especially because the "officers typically
plac[e] themselves in between the passenger selected for an interview and the exit of
the bus." Id. Justice Marshall then concludes that "[t]hese facts alone constitute an
intimidating 'show of authority.' "Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
255. Justice Marshall contends that Bostick was faced with two choices. First, he
could have remained seated and refused to answer the questions of the officers. "But
in light of the intimidating show of authority that the officers made upon boarding the
bus, respondent reasonably could have believed that such behavior would only arouse
the officers' suspicions and intensify their interrogation." Id. at 447. Justice Marshall
goes on to point out that "[i]ndeed, the officers who carry out bus sweeps like the one
at issue here frequently admit that this is the effect of a passenger's refusal to cooper-
ate." Id. Moreover, "a passenger unadvised of his rights and otherwise unversed in
constitutional law has no reason to know that the police cannot hold his refusal to coop-
erate against him." Id. at 447 (emphasis in original). Justice Marshall argues that
although Bostick's second choice would have been to leave the bus altogether, "doing
so would have required [Bostick) to squeeze past the gun-wielding inquisitor who was
blocking the aisle... hardly ... a course that [Bostick] reasonably would have viewed
as available to him." Id. at 448.
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predicament of the consent-giver, 6 and it allows a certain class of
people to be preyed upon either because of unintended and unfore-
seen result of their decisions, or because of circumstances beyond
their control." 7
3. Wyman v. James: Fictional Consent
A consent-as-coercion inquiry is problematic in another respect.
Because such an inquiry allows the fact-finder to substitute his
judgment in lieu of the supposed consent-giver's judgment, the re-
sulting consent cannot be anything else other than fictional. A
hypothetical based upon the facts of Wyman v. James2  provides a
useful example.
In Wyman, a parent brought suit against the New York
Department of Social Services challenging the Department's policy
of denying AFDC benefits to mothers unless they allow warrantless
periodic visits of their homes by a caseworker. 2 9 The issue presented
was whether the state can constitutionally require the mother, Ms.
James, to permit warrantless periodic visits to her home if she
wanted to receive AFDC benefits. ' °
Changing the facts of Wyman a little, suppose that the State of
New York notices a dramatic increase in crack-addicted infant
births. Not only is there an increase throughout the state, but the
tragedy is most particularly acute among women receiving AFDC.
Responding to the outcry, the Governor of New York decrees that
henceforth new AFDC recipients must consent to periodic warrant-
less searches of their homes by caseworkers as a condition of
receiving the largesse of the state. Moreover, current recipients must
do the same if they wished to remain on the dole.
As one currently receiving AFDC benefits, Ms. James receives a
call from a caseworker. The caseworker informs Ms. James that if
256. Justice Marshall asserts that the majority's argument that "Bostick's freedom of
movement was restricted by a factor independent of police conduct-i.e., by his being
on a bus," id. at 436, "borders on sophism and trivializes the values that underlie the
Fourth Amendment," id. at 450. Justice Marshall asserts that the purpose of "officers
who conduct suspicionless, dragnet-style sweeps [is to] put passengers to the choice of
cooperating or of exiting their buses and possibly being stranded in unfamiliar loca-
tions. It is exactly because this 'choice' is no 'choice' at all that police engage in this
technique." Id.
257. Justice Marshall maintained that the majority's argument would allow the
class of bus passengers-as opposed to people on the streets or at airport terminals-
to be preyed upon because of the "considerably confining environment" of a bus. Id. at
449.
258. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
259. Id. at 313-14.
260. Id. at 310.
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she wishes to continue receiving AFDC benefits a home visit will be
required. Ms. James replies that she does not want to allow the visit,
although she does not feel that she has a choice-if she does not
receive the benefits she and her children will starve. When the
caseworker comes for the visit, while renewing her earlier
objections, Ms. James nevertheless reluctantly allows the caseworker
in the house. During the visit, the caseworker notices evidence of
crack cocaine use in the James home and informs the police. Based
upon the complaint, the police obtain a search warrant. While
executing the search warrant the police find crack and crack
paraphernalia. Mrs. James is arrested and prosecuted.
On appeal, she challenges the trial court's denial of her motion
to suppress the evidence found in the home on the ground that the
caseworker's visit was an unconstitutional search. The state defends
and triumphs by maintaining that the search was constitutional pur-
suant to consent validly acquired. Mrs. James loses in the Court of
Appeals, appeals to the Supreme Court, which grants certiorari.
Suppose the Court agrees with Mrs. James that the home visit by the
261caseworker constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes,
and the central issue on appeal is whether the search was consen-
sual. Why should the state prevail as a normative matter?
262The best answer is piobably provided by Professor Stuntz. He
furnishes two possibilities. On one hand, by focusing on the conduct
of the police (recall Bostick as an example) one can argue that the
State should win because innocent people in the state of New York
have an interest in reducing the level of crack-addicted births, and
permitting the searches facilitates that goal.2  In addition, they also
value freedom from arbitrary police conduct. Therefore, judicial
scrutiny is necessary to assure that police action is reasonable.2 " If
the police action is reasonable, then the fruit of the search should be
admissible.
On the other hand, by focusing on the administrative scheme,
the search is arguably constitutional because if the state were to sus-
pend benefits to the beneficiaries they would be worse off than if the
261. In Wyman v. James, the Court was not convinced that the visits could be charac-
terized as searches and maintained that even if the home visits could be viewed as
bearing certain characteristics of searches, they are not within the purview of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 317.
262. William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553 (1992).
263. Id. at 562.
264. Id.
265. Under the Court's current doctrine, Professor Stuntz's approach is correct. See
Arizona v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1184 (1995) (holding that the purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is to deter unconstitutional public conduct); United States v. Calandra,
411 U.S. 338, 447 (1974) (making essentially the same conclusion).
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state were to conduct the search. That is, the harm that would come
from losing their benefits would be greater than the harm that
would result from an administrative search.2"
Fundamentally, Professor Stuntz's options leave us with two
conclusions. First, in the police-suspect context, police conduct is
"reasonable" whenever the net social freedom is improved.267 Sec-
ond, in the administrative context, the conduct of the state should be
judicially approved whenever the Court finds it in the best interest
of the beneficiary to do So.26 That is, the Court should find that Mrs.
James consented to the search because, if the Court proscribes the
home visits and the state suspends benefits, Mrs. James would be
worse off than she would be if the searches are allowed. Professor
Stuntz justifies the result on the basis of his theory that this is the
result that the parties-the government and Mrs. James-would
have adopted if they had been able to negotiate in advance. 69 He
maintains that such a result reflects an implicit bargain between the
consent-giver and the government. 27 This is what the consent in-
quiry has come to. At its best, the inquiry reflects the fact-finder's
judgment about what is necessary for society, and/or the fact-
finder's judgment about what the consent-seeker would have done
ex ante.
Many commentators have criticized the majority's analysis in
27 212Bostick7 and in Wyman. That is not the object of this Note. As with
the issue of administrative searches discussed in Part II, this Note
only seeks to highlight the fact that if consent as an inquiry is to
serve as a meaningful accommodative tool, the search for coercive-
266. Id. at 564.
267. That is, the net social freedom is improved whenever the cost of abating the
behavior in question is less than the harm caused by the behavior being abated and
the police intrusion. Id. at 553-61; see also Packer, supra note 172, at 10 (stating that the
ultimate claim of the Crime Control Model is that "the criminal process is a positive
guarantor of social freedom") (citation omitted).
268. Stuntz, supra note 262, at 564-67.
269. Id. at 555.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis
After Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799 (1991); Dwight L. Greene, Justice
Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in
Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979 (1993); Maclin, supra note 224, at 799; Michael
J. Reed, Jr., Comment, Florida v. Bostick. The Fourth Amendment Takes a Back Seat to the
Drug War, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 825 (1993); Christian J. Rowley, Note, Florida v. Bos-
tick The Fourth Amendment-Another Casualty of the War on Drugs, 1992 UTAH L. REV.
601.
272. See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helpless-
ness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991); Ginny Kim, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions: Is the
Fourth Amendment for Sale in Public Housing?, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165 (1995); Johna-
than Romberg, Essay, Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Reform and the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051 (1995).
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ness should not focus on the question of whether the consent-seeker
has exhibited any undue influences. Rather it should focus on the
choices facing the individual giving consent and the probable coer-
cive forces that may be acting upon him-including any undue
influences exerted by the consent-seeker.
4. Consent in the Administrative Search Context:
The Need for Careful Scrutiny
Consent in the administrative context gives rise to different
values and circumstances than consent in the police-suspect
domain.273 Justice Marshall's criticism of Bostick notwithstanding,7 4
the majority's analysis is quite consistent with the Crime Control
Model's emphasis on police discretion.275 As already argued,
discretion is important because the model wishes to respond to the
unpredictable needs of the police-suspect domain.276 Because the
concern for police discretion and the need to provide rules that the
police can apply in unpredictable circumstances are not present in
the administrative context, the Court should be very cautious before
exporting the current consent doctrine, wholesale, into the that
domain. On the other hand, consent searches in the administrative
context are often planned and predictable events. Consequently, it is
possible for the would-be consent givers to enter into explicit ex ante
bargains that would govern the terms of these searches.
In many ways the argument with respect to consent involves
277
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. If valid consent in-
volves something more than the actions of the consent-seeker (e.g., if
the consent-as-waiver argument ever prevails) it then becomes more
difficult to ignore the coercion faced by the consent-giver.278 Hence,
273. For an interesting discussion of the differing values in the police-suspect con-
text and the administrative context see Stuntz, supra note 262.
274. For an interesting exposition on Justice Marshall's dissent in Bostick, see
Maclin supra note 224, at 799-811.
275. See Packer, supra note 172, at 7-13. It would not be much of a stretch to main-
tain that the model's motto, au fond, is "discretion, discretion, until coercion." As a
corollary one should add, "and no coercion without force."
276. See supra Section III.B.
277. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that "even if a state has
absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege
subject to conditions that improperly 'coerce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the waiver of
constitutional rights." Richard Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-7 (1987).
278. The focus here is on the part of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that is
concerned with the coercive actions of government. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1419-20 (1989) (describing how
one approach to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions "locates the harm of
rights-pressuring conditions on government benefits in their coercion of the
[VOL. 2:461
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judicial scrutiny of a suit brought by a public housing resident chal-
lenging the validity of a consent to search clause would involve
more than an examination of the actions of the defendant Local
Housing Authority for coercion27 and a finding for the defendant
without regard for the coercive forces faced by the resident.20 An
analysis of the circumstances from which consent is to be given in
public housing may help to reveal potentially coercive situations.
Justice Marshall's two-step analysis in Bostick serves as a useful
guide.8
It is also wise to heed Justice Douglas's advice expressed in his
concurrence in Thorpe v. City of Durham.282 Justice Douglas' state-
ments are appropriate to this situation. He maintained:
The recipient of a government benefit, be it a tax exemp-
tion, unemployment compensation, public employment, a
license to practice law, or a home in a public housing proj-
ect, cannot be made to forfeit the benefit because he
beneficiary. Coercion... does not take the form of force or fraud; the beneficiary who
accepts or rejects a conditioned benefit ostensibly expresses some kind of voluntary
choice between the benefit and the right."). Id.
279. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 828 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the absence of official coercion is the sine qua non of effective consent); United
States v. Barbour, 70 F.3d 580, 585 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant who
signed a consent to search form and waived his Miranda rights did so voluntarily, and
that the "fact that [the] defendant suffers a mental disability does not, by itself, render
a waiver involuntary there must be coercion by an official actor .... Absent any
evidence of psychological or physical coercion on the part of the agents, there is no
basis for declaring [the defendant's] statements and consent to search involuntary.").
280. See, e.g., Thaler, supra note 57, at 1792 (commenting that "Ithe presence of
limited choices and unequal bargaining power, by themselves ... do not constitute
duress" sufficient enough to be of troubling consequence).
281. The first step is to analyze the nature of the administrative activity. If
proposed consent searches are anything like the sweeps conducted by the Chicago
Housing Authority, then there is indeed cause to fear. One commentator describes the
sweeps as an operation in which "CHA officials and Chicago police officers staged a
military-like assault on one of the CHA's . . . buildings," sealed off "all building
entrances and secured the stairways, hallways, and other common areas. Then, both
police and CHA officials conducted door-to-door searches for weapons, drugs,
unauthorized residents, and unsafe and unsanitary conditions." Id. at 1778-79. The
second step is to ascertain the effect of the activity on the individual. A profile of the
typical public housing resident discloses that such a resident is most likely minority,
female, elderly and on a subsidized income. The statistical profile of the Chicago
Housing Authority for 1991-92 revealed that 91% of the occupants residing in family
housing were African-American; 30% were females aged 20 to 61, whereas only 7%
were males aged 20 to 61; the remaining residents were children, and only 10% of the
adult residents were employed. CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY STATISTICAL PROFILE
(on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
The question courts should ask is if, given a person's situation (i.e., class, gen-
der, race), has s/he made a free and unconstrained decision when the choice was
between no housing or living in government subsidized housing and having to submit
to warrantless searches of his/her home at the discretion of the housing authority?
282. 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (per curiam).
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exercises a constitutional right .... "[Tihe right to continue
the exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be
made to depend upon the grantee's submission to a con-
dition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the
provisions of the federal Constitution.2s3
Given the importance of housing as a basic need, and the
demographics of those who inhabit public housing, requiring public
housing residents to consent to warrantless searches in exchange for
the benefit of living in public housing without strict judicial scrutiny
may force them to forego their Fourth Amendment protections in
exchange for discretionary government benefits. Such a situation
may trigger the application of the Court's unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. Consequently, it is important that any
consent-based regime be carefully scrutinized.
C. Consent in Public Housing: Some Possibilities
Notwithstanding the state of current consent doctrine,27 how
should a consent regime operate in the context of public housing?
Presumably, if consent clauses became standard practice-if they are
routinely incorporated into public housing leases-they would most
likely be executed within certain shared parameters. That is, they
would reflect the circumstances under which they were obtained.
283. Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
284. See, e.g., Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (applying the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions to the area of eminent domain); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.,
497 U.S. 62 (1990) (using the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to strike down a
patronage system); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (finding that it is an unconsti-
tutional condition for the government to terminate an employee because of the
employee's party affiliations); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (maintaining
that the government cannot deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally
protected speech); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497, 500 (1967) (holding that
where defendants were given the choice to either "forfeit their jobs or to incriminate
themselves ... [t]he option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of
self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent....
There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by
the exaction of a price.").
285. After Bostick one must ask if the consent inquiry has any bite. In truth, it is
misleading to speak of a consent inquiry. Although the Court purports to engage in a
very broad inquiry, stating as its aim a grand objective-whether consent was the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker-in reality it
engages in a much narrower examination: has the consent-seeker engaged in coercive
conduct in obtaining consent? As a consequence, the inquiry is not so much a search
for coerciveness as it is a search for undue influence on the part of the consent-seeker.
The consent inquiry does not scrutinize the coercion faced by the consent-giver that is
not the making of the consent-seeker. Consequently, those issues are never analyzed.
What is referred to as a "consent inquiry" is essentially a search for coercive behavior
on the part of the police.
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First, they would be in writing; second, they would inform tenants
of their legal options; and third, they would demarcate the scope of
the searches that are permitted under these clauses with varying de-
grees of specificity. These three basic requirements should and must
be met. Beyond these shared characteristics, consent in the context of
public housing can take the form of four distinct regimes.286
Under one regime-the unconditional consent regime-signing
a consent form would be a requirement for obtaining public
housing. Prospective tenants would be told that they have a right to
refuse consent. However, if they refuse to sign the consent form
their application for a unit will be summarily rejected. Under a
second regime--the conditional consent regime--signing the
consent form would not be the sine qua non of approval for a unit.
The prospective tenants would be informed ex ante that they have
the option to consent in advance of searches of their units. If they
refuse to do so they will still be allowed to move into the unit. A
third regime would be a majority-rule (or super-majority rule),
where a whole housing complex-or different buildings within a
complex-would be governed by the outcome of an annual vote of
the residents. If the residents vote in favor of warrantless searches
each resident would be subject to those searches for one year, until
the next vote. Thus "consent" would be irrevocable, at least for one
year. The last regime, and the one that this Note favors, is one in
which different complexes within a city, or different buildings in a
complex, would be reserved for residents who wish to consent to
warrantless searches, within the parameters stated above.
The essential question presented by each regime is whether the
consent procured by that regime's consent-seeking mechanism can
be considered uncoerced for Fourth Amendment purposes. One way
of addressing that question is to inquire into the relationship
between the doctrine of consent and the Fourth Amendment, within
the framework of a constitutional democracy. As grandiose as this
inquiry sounds, it need not be so. One need only borrow from what
has already been developed by political theorists and political
philosophers, and shape accordingly for the present purposes.
The idea of consent is an important concept in a democracy
because governance through consent is the most efficient287 and the
286. That is not to say that any number of these four regimes cannot be blended
together to form another variation. For example, any regime involving consent clauses
as part of public housing lease agreements will generally be organized in one of the
four ways, or by some combination of the four.
287. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the
Adversarial Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal
for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 762 (1995) ("Power relies on the consensus to
govern because without consent it cannot govern efficiently.").
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most legitimate288 method of governance. For consent to be truly
legitimate, it must be neither fraudulently acquired nor procured
through manipulation. 89 There are three axiomatic principles in
determining if consent was properly procured. First, the consent-
giver must be adequately informed so as to prevent the
manipulation of his/her consent.290 Second, consent given under the
express or implied threat of coercion or actual use of force is not
legitimate.91 Third, it is presumed that the consent-giver is an
autonomous individual capable of giving consent and whose
decision is to be respected by the consent-seeker.m Government
action on the basis of fictional consent simply serves to "override the
real-life dissent of actual people."'9'
Applying these three principles to the four regimes described
above, it becomes clear why the fourth regime is the least objection-
able. The unconditional consent regime is problematic in light of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. As illustrated by the Wyman
hypothetical, it is difficult to argue that a resident "consents" to a
search when the choices are between housing and constitutional
rights. Given that other less problematic options are available, it is
not necessary to entertain that fiction. The conditional consent re-
gime is less objectionable, but as a practical matter it is ineffectual.
Presumably, residents who would consent to a warrantless search
are most likely not the residents responsible for the drugs, guns, and
violence.
The majority-rule regime is probably the most intellectually
elegant of the four. A problem with this regime, however, is the fact
that a majority (or super-majority) of residents, if they vote in favor
of warrantless searches, are waiving the rights of minority. One may
288. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 30 (2d ed. 1986)
("Legitimacy, being the stability of a good government over time, is the fruit of con-
sent to specific actions or to the authority to act; the consent to the exercise of
authority .... ).
289. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 IND.
L.J. 331, 374 (1995) (stating that popular "consent is fraudulent if the consent given is
dictated or controlled by the political authority whose legitimacy rests on the demo-
cratic approval of the populace").
290. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
291. See Gey, supra note 289.
292. See, e.g., Robert Justin Lipkin, Liberalism and the Possibility of Multi-Cultural
Constitutionalism: The Distinction Between Deliberative and Dedicated Cultures, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1263, 1289 (1995) (stating that "deliberative consent requires individual
autonomy, and autonomy refers to the operation of each individual's capacity for
practical reasoning"); R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing
Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1397 (1995) ("Making legal right
and duties contingent on consent... serves human dignity.").
293. Roderick T. Long, Immanent Liberalism: The Politics of Mutual Consent, in THE
JUST SOCIETY 16 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1995).
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wonder if that arrangement is any different than private
organizations such as homeowners' associations, community
associations,294 or condominium associations, which require their
residents to conform to a certain behavioral norm.295
A debate over the similarity or lack therecf of the two situations
is avoided with the fourth regime. This option avoids the problem of
the unconditional consent regime by providing residents will real
choices. If a prospective resident is otherwise eligible for an
apartment, one will be provided irrespective of that person's
decision to consent to a warrantless search. It avoids the problem of
the conditional consent regime by placing all residents who wish to
establish a like-minded community in the same complex-or
building as the case may be. This regime comes closest to treating
the public resident as if she were a resident of private housing. 6
Private housing residents routinely face the safety versus security
issue as well as a host of other housing issues. The major difference
is that more choices are often available to such people because of
their class, and sometimes because of their race and gender. This
regime attempts to provide a certain modicum of choice to the
public housing resident. That choice has too often been exercised by
public actors (legislators, judges, advocates, and academics). It is
now time for public housing residents to have legitimate choices,
and for their wishes to be respected. If consent is to serve as a useful
accommodation tool there must be legitimate choice.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to sympathize with those attempting to provide safety
and security for public housing residents. Unfortunately, two of the
mostly widely advocated proposals for effecting safe and secure
public housing-warrantless searches and consent searches-raise
troubling Fourth Amendment concerns. It is unnecessary, however,
for public housing residents to be given a Hobson's choice; they
need not choose between their right to privacy and their right to
safety. This Note argues that, at a minimum, consent for warrantless
294. See generally Marvin J. Nodiff, Decision-Making in the Community Association:
Do the Old Rules Still Apply?, 52 J. Mo. B. 141 (1996) (discussing the unique roles and
functions of homeowners, community associations, and third parties in community
association law).
295. One commentator describes condominium associations as "mini-governments"
with the power to enforce rules and regulations, adopt budgets, collect assessments,
and perform other functions. Paul S. Jacobsen, Standing of Condominium Associations to
Sue: One For All or All For One?, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 15, 17 (1990).
296. That is, the prospective public housing resident is now confronted with similar
choices as her non-public housing resident counterpart.
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searches should be obtained in writing, should inform tenants of
their legal options, and should delineate the scope of the searches to
which consent is being given. A variety of options available to pub-
lic housing authorities meet these criteria, including unconditional
or conditional consent clauses in leases, annual votes by buildings
and complexes to allow or not allow warrantless searches, and
specifying certain complexes or buildings for residents who wish to
consent to warrantless searches.
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